Ideas from 'works' by Jerry A. Fodor [1986], by Theme Structure

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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
How does anything get outside itself?
                        Full Idea: Fodor asks the stirring and basic question 'How does anything get outside itself?'
                        From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by C.B. Martin - The Mind in Nature 03.6
                        A reaction: Is this one of those misconceived questions, like major issues concerning 'what's it like to be?' In what sense am I outside myself? Is a mind any more mysterious than a shadow?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese?
                        Full Idea: For Fodor the intentionality of the propositional-attitude vocabulary of our folk psychology is the outward expression of the inward intentionality of the language of the brain.
                        From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.39
                        A reaction: I would be very cautious about this. Folk psychology works, so it must have a genuine basis in how brains work, but it breaks down in unusual situations, and might even be a total (successful) fiction.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"?
                        Full Idea: Fodor holds that beliefs are brain states or processes, but picked out at a 'higher' or 'special science' level.
                        From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.82
                        A reaction: I don't think you can argue with this. Levels of physical description exist (e.g. pure physics tells you nothing about the weather), and I think 'process' is the best word for the mind (Idea 4931).
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
Is thought a syntactic computation using representations?
                        Full Idea: The modest mentalism of the Computational/Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT), associated with Fodor, says mental processes are computational, defined over syntactically specified entities, and these entities represent the world (are also semantic).
                        From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind Int.3
                        A reaction: This seems to imply that if you built a machine that did all these things, it would become conscious, which sounds unlikely. Do footprints 'represent' feet, or does representation need prior consciousness?
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so
                        Full Idea: Fodor is concerned with producing a realist and physicalist account of 'narrow content' (i.e. wholly in-the-head content).
                        From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.54
                        A reaction: The emergence of 'wide' content has rather shaken Fodor's game plan. We can say "Oh dear, I thought I was referring to H2O", so there must be at least some narrow aspect to reference.