Ideas from 'On Freedom' by Gottfried Leibniz [1689], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Writings' by Leibniz,Gottfried (ed/tr Parkinson,G.H.R.) [Dent 1973,0-460-11905-2]].

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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable
                        Full Idea: Derivative truths are of two sorts: some are analysed into original truths, others admit of an infinite process of analysis. The former are necessary, the latter are contingent.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.108)
                        A reaction: An intriguing proposal. Hume would presumably see contingent truths as being analysed until you reach 'impressions'. Analysis of necessary truths soon comes to the blinding light of what is obvious, but analysis of contingency never gets there.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
Only God sees contingent truths a priori
                        Full Idea: Only God sees contingent truths a priori.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.95)
                        A reaction: This because everything is interconnected, and the whole picture must be seen to understand a contingent truth.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary
                        Full Idea: If certain possibles never exist, then existing things are not always necessary; otherwise it would be impossible for other things to exist instead of them, and so all things that never exist would be impossible.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.106)
                        A reaction: A neat argument, though it is not self-evident that when possibles came into existence they would have to replace what is already there. Can't something be possible, but only in another world, because this one is already booked?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason
                        Full Idea: We can regard it as certain that everything is done by God in the most perfect way, that he does nothing which is contrary to reason.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.109)
                        A reaction: The famous optimism which Voltaire laughed at in 'Candide'. I can't help thinking that there is an ideal of God being ABOVE reason. We reason, and give reasons, because we are unsure, and life is a struggle. The highest ideal is mystically self-evident.