Ideas from 'The Elm and the Expert' by Jerry A. Fodor [1993], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Elm and the Expert' by Fodor,Jerry A. [MIT 1995,0-262-56093-3]].
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
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2463
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A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
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2435
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Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
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2442
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Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
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2462
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Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
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2461
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An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time
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Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean
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2454
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We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments
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Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
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Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
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2443
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I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
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2453
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We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
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2445
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Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again
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2446
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Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
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2447
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Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
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Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
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Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
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2437
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XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
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2441
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Truth conditions require a broad concept of content
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
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Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff
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18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
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Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content
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18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
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Is content basically information, fixed externally?
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
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2438
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In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
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2439
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Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences
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If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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2451
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To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
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2433
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For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
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2436
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It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth)
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
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2434
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Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
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2459
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Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is
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