Ideas from 'Making Mind Matter More' by Jerry A. Fodor [1989], by Theme Structure
[found in 'A Theory of Content and other essays' by Fodor,Jerry A. [MIT 1994,0-262-56069-0]].
green numbers give full details |
back to texts
|
unexpand these ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
2599
|
Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true
|
|
|
|
Full Idea:
The avoidance of epiphenomenalism requires making it plausible that intentional properties can meet sufficient conditions for causal responsibility.
|
|
|
|
From:
Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.154)
|
|
|
|
A reaction:
A wordy way of saying we either have epiphenomenalism, or the mind had better do something - and a good theory will show how. The biggest problem of the mind may not be Chalmer's Hard Question (qualia), but how thought-contents cause things.
|
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
2597
|
Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws
|
|
|
|
Full Idea:
I argue that (contrary to the doctrine called "anomalous monism") there is no good reason to doubt that there are intentional causal laws.
|
|
|
|
From:
Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.151)
|
|
|
|
A reaction:
I certainly can't see a good argument, in Davidson or anywhere else, to demonstrate their impossibility. Give the complexity of the brain, they would be like the 'laws' for weather or geology.
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2598
|
Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be?
|
|
|
|
Full Idea:
If one of your reasons for doubting that believing-that-P is a physical property is that believing is multiply realizable, then you have the same reason for doubting that being an airfoil (or a mountain) counts as a physical property.
|
|
|
|
From:
Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.153)
|
|
|
|
A reaction:
This merely points out that functionalism is not incompatible with physicalism, which must be right.
|