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Ideas from 'Making Mind Matter More' by Jerry A. Fodor [1989], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Theory of Content and other essays' by Fodor,Jerry A. [MIT 1994,0-262-56069-0]].

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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
2599 Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true
                        Full Idea: The avoidance of epiphenomenalism requires making it plausible that intentional properties can meet sufficient conditions for causal responsibility.
                        From: Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.154)
                        A reaction: A wordy way of saying we either have epiphenomenalism, or the mind had better do something - and a good theory will show how. The biggest problem of the mind may not be Chalmer's Hard Question (qualia), but how thought-contents cause things.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
2597 Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws
                        Full Idea: I argue that (contrary to the doctrine called "anomalous monism") there is no good reason to doubt that there are intentional causal laws.
                        From: Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.151)
                        A reaction: I certainly can't see a good argument, in Davidson or anywhere else, to demonstrate their impossibility. Give the complexity of the brain, they would be like the 'laws' for weather or geology.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2598 Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be?
                        Full Idea: If one of your reasons for doubting that believing-that-P is a physical property is that believing is multiply realizable, then you have the same reason for doubting that being an airfoil (or a mountain) counts as a physical property.
                        From: Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.153)
                        A reaction: This merely points out that functionalism is not incompatible with physicalism, which must be right.