Ideas from 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet' by René Descartes [1644], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Philosophy of Mind' (ed/tr Beakley,B /Ludlow P) [MIT 1992,0-262-52167-9]].

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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'?
                        Full Idea: Please tell me what the corporeal motion is that is capable of forming some common notion to the effect that 'things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other'.
                        From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.366)
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought
                        Full Idea: I have never written or taken the view that the mind requires innate ideas which are something distinct from its own faculty of thinking.
                        From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.365)
Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them
                        Full Idea: The ideas of pains, colours, sounds etc. must be all the more innate if, on the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of representing them to itself, for there is no similarity between these ideas and the corporeal motions.
                        From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.365)
                        A reaction: Simple and brilliant! We know perfectly well that there is no redness zooming through the air from a tomato (or the air would be pink!). Redness occurs when the light arrives, so we add the redness, so it is innate.