Ideas from 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' by John Searle [1992], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' by Searle,John R. [MIT 1999,0-262-69154-x]].
green numbers give full details |
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expand these ideas
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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3508
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Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
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3473
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Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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3532
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Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin]
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3533
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Is supervenience just causality? [Maslin]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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3454
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Reality is entirely particles in force fields
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
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3471
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Some properties depend on components, others on their relations
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3472
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Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
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3491
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Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background
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3490
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Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
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3482
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Perception is a function of expectation
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12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
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3493
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Memory is mainly a guide for current performance
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
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3463
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We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
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3457
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Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
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3480
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We experience unity at an instant and across time
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
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3479
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The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
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3470
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Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
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3486
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Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones
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3503
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Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
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3465
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Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it
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3484
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Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality
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3489
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Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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3481
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Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality
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3494
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Intentionality is defined in terms of representation
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
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4088
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Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
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3467
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Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense
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3483
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Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
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3468
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I cannot observe my own subjectivity
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
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3469
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Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
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3487
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Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
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3458
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Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily
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3485
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Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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3461
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Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
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3496
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A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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3499
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Computation presupposes consciousness
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3501
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If we are computers, who is the user?
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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3475
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Property dualism denies reductionism
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3456
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Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
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3453
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Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
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3455
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Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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3476
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Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect
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3477
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If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism
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3531
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Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston
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3478
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Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
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3466
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Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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9317
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Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Kriegel/Williford]
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3474
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If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain?
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3500
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Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition?
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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3497
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If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
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3462
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We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
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3498
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Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
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3492
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Content is much more than just sentence meaning
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
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3464
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There is no such thing as 'wide content'
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
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3506
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We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
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3451
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Meaning is derived intentionality
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
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3450
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Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
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3507
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Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
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3495
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Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
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3505
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The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
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3504
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Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour
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27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
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3502
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Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating
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28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
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3459
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You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit
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