Ideas from 'works' by Michael Dummett [1970], by Theme Structure
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
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Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle
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Full Idea:
Dummett argues that antirealism implies that classical logic must be given up in favour of some form of intuitionistic logic that does not have the law of excluded middle as a theorem.
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From:
report of Michael Dummett (works [1970]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 9.4
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A reaction:
Only realists can think every proposition is either true or false, even if it is beyond the bounds of our possible knowledge (e.g. tiny details from remote history). Personally I think "Plato had brown eyes" is either true or false.
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
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For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects
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Full Idea:
Dummett says that anti-realism offers us a picture of reality as an amorphous lump not yet articulated into discrete objects.
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From:
report of Michael Dummett (works [1970]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.2
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A reaction:
This might be called 'weak' anti-realism, where 'strong' anti-realism is the view that reality is quite unknowable, and possibly non-existent.
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