Ideas from 'Psychology from an empirical standpoint' by Franz Brentano [1874], by Theme Structure

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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality

3364	All mental phenomena contain an object

			Full Idea: Every mental phenomenon contains something as object within itself.
			From: Franz Brentano (Psychology from an empirical standpoint [1874], p. 88), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.21
			A reaction: This gives rise to the slogan that 'intentionality is the mark of the mental', which notoriously seems to miss out the phenomenal aspect of mental life. We note now, though, that even emotions have objects.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

3225	Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect

			Full Idea: Brentano's thesis is that all mental phenomena are intentional i.e. representational. Support for this view is that assimilating phenomenal experience to attitudes we explain the essential unity of the mind.
			From: report of Franz Brentano (Psychology from an empirical standpoint [1874]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 11.5
			A reaction: Unifying intentionality and qualia in a single theory looks like a good move, but which one has priority? Evolutionary theory says priority goes to whatever produces behaviour. My intuition is that qualia are more basic - in tiny insects, say.