Ideas from 'Introducing Persons' by Peter Carruthers [1986], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Introducing Persons' by Carruthers,Peter [Routledge 1992,0-415-04512-6]].

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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own?
                        Full Idea: If the mind is merely a bundle of states and events, it must be logically possible for the various elements of the bundle to exist on their own.
                        From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (A))
                        A reaction: Depends how literally you take the bundle metaphor, and how much you are worried about 'logical' possibility (which only seems to mean imaginable). The answers to these questions do not have to be all-or-nothing.
Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another?
                        Full Idea: What makes it true that a particular thought or experience is a member of one bundle rather than another?
                        From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (B))
                        A reaction: I'm not sure if you can answer this nice question without mentioning values. The mental events in are in my bundle because they matter to me (because they are related to my body, for which I am responsible). Compare picking my possessions out of a pile.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
We identify persons before identifying conscious states
                        Full Idea: We can have no conception of the particularity of conscious states prior to, and independently of, a conception of a particularity of persons.
                        From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (C))
                        A reaction: agrees with Butler