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| 9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics can be judged as the mapping of possibilities. | |||
| From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 2.2 |
| 16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions |
| Full Idea: Lowe argues that the sciences need metaphysics to discharge the assumptions that they simply made at the outset. | |||
| From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998]) by Thomas Hofweber - Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics 1.2 | |||
| A reaction: Hofweber doesn't buy this, and neither do I. I don't think science 'needs' metaphysics (or barely needs it), but I do think metaphysics needs a fair degree of science. It is high-level abstraction based on the facts. |
| 8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change |
| Full Idea: Only metaphysics can vindicate a judgement that a caterpillar survives to become a butterfly, but a pig does not survive to become pork, or that water survives as ice, but that paper does not survive as ash. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2) | |||
| A reaction: The works of Lowe, and other modern heroes, have shown that these real questions can be pursued intensively into areas where no scientist, or even theologian, would dare to tread. |
| 16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is |
| Full Idea: I do not claim that metaphysics on its own can, in general, tell us what there is. Rather - to a first approximation - I hold that metaphysics by itself only tells us what there could be. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3) | |||
| A reaction: If there is going to be a modern defence of metaphysics, in an age dominated by empirical science, this sounds pretty good to me. Presumably it also says what there couldn't be. The challenge is to offer authority for any claims made. |
| 8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? |
| Full Idea: Nothing purely within the theory of meaning is capable of telling us which of two sentences which are paraphrases of one another more accurately reflects the ontological commitments of those who utter them. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3) | |||
| A reaction: This is an attack on the semantic approach to ontology, associated with Quine. Cf. Idea 7923. I have always had an aversion to that approach, and received opinion is beginning to agree. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio..." |
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions |
| Full Idea: If facts are 'proposition-like' or 'thinkable' (we speak of 'knowing' or 'understanding' facts) might they not simply be true propositions? | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2) | |||
| A reaction: They certainly can't be if we are going to use facts as what makes propositions true. The proposal would be empty without out some other account of truth (probably a dubious one). Facts are truth-makers? |
| 8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items |
| Full Idea: Where there is one-to-one correspondence there must certainly be countable, and therefore individuable items of some kind. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.6) | |||
| A reaction: Lowe is criticising precise notions of 'a fact'. We can respond by relaxing the notion of 'one-to-one', if critics are going to be fussy about exactly what the items are. "There is a huge wave coming" doesn't need a precise notion of a wave to be true. |
| 8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members |
| Full Idea: A set is 'a number of things', not a 'collection'. Nothing literally 'collects' the members of a set, such as the set of planets of the sun, unless it be a Fregean 'concept' under which they fall. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.6) | |||
| A reaction: I'm tempted to say that the sun has collected a set of planets (they're the ones that rotate around it). Why can't we have natural sets, which have been collected by nature? A question of the intension, as well as the extension.... |
| 8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions |
| Full Idea: It is not clear to me that the empty set has well-defined identity-conditions. A set has these only to the extent that its members do - but the empty set has none. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.3 n8) | |||
| A reaction: The empty set is widely used by those who base their metaphysics of maths on sets. It defines zero, and hence is the starting poing for Peano's Postulates (Idea 5897). It might not have identity in itself, but you know where you have arrived after 2 - 2. |
| 8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation |
| Full Idea: If we take the existential quantifier to mean 'there is at least one thing that' then its value must qualify as one thing, individuable in principle. ...So I propose to read it as 'there is something that', which implies nothing about individuability. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11) | |||
| A reaction: All sorts of doubts about the existential quantifier seem to be creeping in nowadays (e.g. Ideas 6067, 6069, 8250). Personally I am drawn to the sound of 'free logic', Idea 8250, which drops existential claims. This would reduce metaphysical confusion. |
| 8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality |
| Full Idea: My view is that numbers are universals, beings kinds of sets (that is, kinds whose particular instances are individual sets of appropriate cardinality). | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10) | |||
| A reaction: [That is, 12 is the set of all sets which have 12 members] This would mean, I take it, that if the number of objects in existence was reduced to 11, 12 would cease to exist, which sounds wrong. Or are we allowed imagined instances? |
| 8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous |
| Full Idea: That one-to-one correlated sets of objects are equinumerous is a more sophisticated achievement than the simple ability to count sets of objects. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.9) | |||
| A reaction: This is an objection to Frege's way of defining numbers, in terms of equinumerous sets. I take pattern-recognition to be the foundation of number, and so spotting a pattern would have to precede spotting that two patterns were identical. |
| 8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another |
| Full Idea: What is now known as Hume's Principle says the number of Fs is identical with the number of Gs if and only if the Fs and the Gs are one-to-one correlated with one another. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3) | |||
| A reaction: This seems popular as a tool in attempts to get the concept of number off the ground. Although correlations don't seem to require numbers ('find yourself a partner'), at some point you have to count the correlations. Sets come first, to identify the Fs. |
| 8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa |
| Full Idea: I favour an account of sets which sees them as being instances of numbers, thereby avoiding the unhelpful metaphor which speaks of a set as being a 'collection' of things. This reverses the normal view, which explains numbers in terms of sets. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10) | |||
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 8297. Either a set is basic, or a number is. We might graft onto Lowe's view an account of numbers in terms of patterns, which would give an empirical basis to the picture, and give us numbers which could be used to explain sets. |
| 8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 |
| Full Idea: If 2 is a particular, 'adding' it to itself can, it would seem, only leave us with 2, not another number. (If 'Socrates + Socrates' denotes anything, it most plausibly just denotes Socrates). | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.7) | |||
| A reaction: This suggest Kant's claim that arithmetical sums are synthetic (Idea 5558). It is a nice question why, when you put two 2s together, they come up with something new. Addition is movement. Among patterns, or along abstract sequences. |
| 8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? |
| Full Idea: Does it really matter whether the numbers actually exist - in anything like the way in which it matters that space and time or persons actually exist? | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.6) | |||
| A reaction: Nice question! It might matter a lot. I take the question of numbers to be a key test case, popular with philosophers because they are the simplest and commonest candidates for abstract existence. The ontological status of values is the real issue. |
| 8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects |
| Full Idea: One could argue that some abstract objects exist in all possible worlds (e.g. natural numbers) and that abstract objects always depend for their existence upon concrete objects, and conclude that some concrete objects exist in all possible worlds. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.1) | |||
| A reaction: We're all in the dark on this one, but I quite like this argument. I can't conceive of a reality that lacks natural numbers, and the truths that accompany them, and I personally think that numbers arise from the patterns of physical reality. |
| 8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) |
| Full Idea: For some metaphysicians, possession of causal power is the very hallmark of real existence (and is one reason, for instance, why some have denied the existence of the void or absolute space). | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.2) | |||
| A reaction: You could try saying that space has the power of making movement possible. The 'hallmark' of something doesn't define what it is. Existence without causal power seems logically possible and imaginable, but unlikely. Epiphenomena have this problem. |
| 8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance |
| Full Idea: The extreme views on change are the Heraclitan view - that every change brings into existence an entirely new entity, and destroys what existed before, and the Spinozan view - that all changes are phase changes within a single substance. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2) | |||
| A reaction: The views in between are that bundles of properties shift their contents, or that many substances undergo changes in their properties. The unification of physics might be aiming to vindicate Spinoza. Temporal parts (Lewis) are close to Heraclitus. |
| 8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects |
| Full Idea: My own broadly Aristotelian view is that events are changes (and unchanges) in the properties and relations of persisting objects. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 4.4) | |||
| A reaction: This needs an account of what it is that persists, and the philosophers' (but not physicists') concept of 'substance' fills this role. It is rather hard to give identity-conditions for an event if it is an 'unchange'. How would you count such events? |
| 8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations |
| Full Idea: We must include events in our ontology because they figure indispensably in singular causal explanations. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.5) | |||
| A reaction: Hm. Spirits figure indispensably in supernatural explanations. It would be quite a task to prove that events really are indispensable to causal explanations. Why would nomological or counterfactual causal explanations not have the same need? |
| 8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? |
| Full Idea: Philosophers who invoke facts are divided over whether facts are wholly abstract entities or are complexes capable of containing concrete objects as constituents. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2) | |||
| A reaction: If externalism about concepts was true (see Thought|Content|Broad Content), this would support the second (more concrete) view of facts. The correspondence theory of truth would love to plug belief into the concrete world. Me too. |
| 8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations |
| Full Idea: There is a difficulty for any view of facts which sees them as being wholly abstract entities, and yet also being causal relata; for it seems that only concrete entities, existing in time and space, can enter into causal relations. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.3) | |||
| A reaction: There seems a lot of ambiguity in the air here, between epistemology and ontology (surprise!). I take causation to be a physical activity in the concrete world. Our understanding of it is expressed with abstractions. 'Fact' seems to have two meanings. |
| 8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents |
|
Full Idea:
The most notorious problem besetting the view that facts are structured complexes of constituents is the question of what it is that binds the supposed constituents into the fact. The ordered triple |
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| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.5) | |||
| A reaction: Lowe denies that facts are complex entities on this basis. You only have the problem if Mars and its redness are two 'things'. If redness is intrinsically a dependent item, we may escape. I wish they wouldn't use colours as examples. See Idea 5456. |
| 8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? |
| Full Idea: Although 'fact' is grammatically a count noun, it strikes us as being at best whimsical to talk about enumerating facts - to talk, for instance, about how many facts I learned today before breakfast. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.4) | |||
| A reaction: I always liked the question 'how many facts are there in this room?' One might make a serious attempt to decide how many facts I learned before breakfast, and reach a reasonable approximation, especially if one didn't open the newspaper. |
| 8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria |
| Full Idea: Facts seem to be indispensable as truth-makers and perhaps as causal relata, ..but if we must only include in our ontology things for which we can state a criterion of identity (Quine), ..we seem to be faced with a dilemma. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11) | |||
| A reaction: Lowe proposes to relax the identification requirement (see Idea 8312). This seems a good strategy. An awful lot of strange philosophy arises from insisting on strict conditions for our understanding, and then finding everywhere failure to achieve it. |
| 8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs |
| Full Idea: One of the chief rivals to my own substance-based ontology is the view that holds facts or states of affairs to be the building-blocks of the world. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], Pref) | |||
| A reaction: I think I side with Lowe, even though I am uneasy about the gap between the philosopher's 'substance' and the basic entities of physics. Facts are hard to individuate, and seem to be composed of more basic elements. |
| 8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them |
| Full Idea: Some abstract objects, notably certain universals, need to be invoked for explanatory purposes, even if it cannot be said that they themselves possess causal powers or enter into causal relations. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.2) | |||
| A reaction: I am unconvinced that an entity with no causal powers could be any kind of explanation, given that, by definition, it can't do anything. You would have to think that the world of pure reason functioned without the aid of causal powers. |
| 8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former |
| Full Idea: Ontological categories should not be confused with natural kinds: for natural kinds can only be differentiated in a principled way relative to an accepted framework of ontological categories. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2) | |||
| A reaction: I presume that the natural kinds are likely to be contingent facts about the actual world (though they may entail necessary laws), whereas I like to think, unfashionably, that categories aim at deconstructing the mind of God (roughly). |
| 8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent |
| Full Idea: Some metaphysicians take the highest division to be between abstract and concrete entities, others take it to be between universals and particulars (my own preference, though it is not crucial), and others between necessary and contingent entities. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3) | |||
| A reaction: The first division may be blurred, and I am doubtful about universals, so I favour the third. Intuition tells me that there is nothing more basic than the distinction between what is true in all worlds and what is only true in some. The former is bedrock. |
| 13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete |
| Full Idea: Lowe's Ontological Categories: ENTITIES - {Universals - [Kinds - (Non-natural)(Natural)] [Properties, Relations]} {Particulars - [Abstracta - (Sets)(others)] [Concreta - (Objects)(Non-Objects)]} etc | |||
| From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], p.181) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01 | |||
| A reaction: [my linear representation of a tree diagram; bracket-styles show levels] Lowe's levels below these divide according to whether things are 'substances' or not. I've heard Kit Fine tease Lowe for being too simplistic about ontology. |
| 8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? |
| Full Idea: "The Thames is broad in London" might be taken as 'The Thames is broad-in-London', or as 'The Thames is-in-London broad', or as 'The Thames-in-London is broad'. I would urge the superiority of the second one, as an analysis of the normal meaning. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5.8) | |||
| A reaction: He uses the example to attack the perdurance view of objects (i.e. the third analysis). I think I agree with Lowe, but I'm not sure, and I just love the example. Read the second as 'The Thames is (in London) broad'? 'Is' of existence, or predication? |
| 8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence |
| Full Idea: Some philosophers call particularised properties of objects 'tropes', but I prefer the older term 'mode' (or 'individual accident'), because this term rightly has the implication that such entities are existentially dependent ones, depending on objects. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3) | |||
| A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that philosophical terminology is not as metaphysically innocent as it sometimes pretends to be. I agree with Lowe. |
| 8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects |
| Full Idea: I do not believe that tropes or modes can have well-defined or fully determinate identity-conditions, and hence do not believe that they should be thought of as 'objects'. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3) | |||
| A reaction: Lowe's account would still allow them to be 'entities'. Any proposal that they have an existence of their own, apart from the objects on which they depend, sounds very misguided. We won't make progress if we don't identify the real properties. |
| 8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? |
| Full Idea: It seems that tropes are identity-dependent upon their possessors, but it is difficult to square this claim with the thesis that the possessors of tropes are themselves just bundles of tropes. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8) | |||
| A reaction: This circularity in all attempts to individuate tropes is Lowe's main reason for rejecting them. It does seem that the sphericity of a ball must be either identified against other (universal) sphericities, or by the sphere that has the property. |
| 8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? |
| Full Idea: Why cannot a certain trope 'float free' of the trope-bundle to which it belongs and migrate to another bundle? | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8) | |||
| A reaction: Tropes are said to be dependent on their possessors, but at the same time to exist as particulars. Lowe's suggestion is that you can't have it both ways. A particular sphericity with no sphere does not even make sense. |
| 8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? |
| Full Idea: If a round ball fits snugly into a round piece of plaster, do they contain the same roundness trope, or do they contain numerically distinct but exactly similar and coinciding roundness tropes? | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8) | |||
| A reaction: A microscope would distinguish them, and they are made of different types of matter. Is a hole in a piece of paper a circular cut and a circular area of space? Neither example looks good for tropes. |
| 8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not |
| Full Idea: I want to distinguish 'substantial' universals from 'non-substantial' universals. The former are denoted by sortal terms, such as 'statue' and 'tiger', whereas the latter are denoted by adjectival terms, such as 'red' and 'spherical'. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.3) | |||
| A reaction: It is an interesting question whether or not (assuming you are committed to universals) a universal necessarily implies an associated substance. If a property is a power, it must be a power of something. Nominalists will deny his distinction. |
| 8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature |
| Full Idea: I base my case for realism about universals on the need to explain the status of natural laws. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.6) | |||
| A reaction: I need black magic to explain why my watch has disappeared. The key question, then, would be what we understand by the 'laws of nature'. I am inclined to think that scientific essentialism (qv) can build laws out of natural kinds. Idea 6614. |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables |
| Full Idea: A particular is something (not necessarily an object) which instantiates but is not itself instantiated. Universals, on the other hand, necessarily have instances (or, at least, are instantiable). | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.4) | |||
| A reaction: This is Lowe's proposal for distinction. It at least establishes the direction of dependency, but I find the notion of 'instantiation' to be as obscure and problematic as the Platonic notion of 'partaking' (see in Ontology|Universals|Platonic Forms). |
| 16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions |
| Full Idea: The only metaphysically defensible notion of an object is precisely that of an entity which possesses determinate identity-conditions. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3) | |||
| A reaction: I think he includes abstract objects in this. I suspect this view of muddling epistemology and ontology. Or overemphasising our conventions, rather than reality. |
| 8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality |
| Full Idea: An obvious suggestion is that concrete objects are denizens of space-time, and hence subject to causality, though Hale objects that languages are plausibly abstract and yet undergo change and so presumably exist in time. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.10) | |||
| A reaction: The identity-conditions for a language are pretty loose. Choosing a counterexample from the mental life of human beings begs a billion questions. I can't think of a problem case beyond the world of human culture. |
| 8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value |
| Full Idea: Whether objects of a given kind should be thought actually to exist should, in general, be taken to turn on considerations of whether an inclusion of such objects in one's ontology has explanatory value. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3) | |||
| A reaction: Blatantly fictional objects, such as fairies, might have wonderful explanatory value (they place dewdrops on flowers). Our ontological commitments cannot be decided one at a time, because consistency of the whole picture is the key value. |
| 8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects |
| Full Idea: I distinguish objects as those entities - whether abstract or concrete, universal or particular - which possess fully determinate identity-conditions, but there are, or may be, entities other than objects. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7) | |||
| A reaction: A wave on the sea is a candidate for being an entity but not an object. The distinction is probably not quite common usage, but it strikes as one which philosophers should universally adopt. Lots of entities, and some of them are objects. |
| 8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions |
| Full Idea: To be an object is simply to be an entity possessing determinate identity-conditions. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3) | |||
| A reaction: This is a nice clear-cut claim, which sounds good, except that there may be a blurring of ontology and epistemology. Presumably the conditions are for the concept, not for an actual act of identification. Maybe we are too stupid to conceive them. |
| 8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity |
| Full Idea: There can be determinate countability even where there is not determinate identity; it is not in dispute that there are two electrons in the shell of a neutral helium atom, even though the identity of electrons is not determinate. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 3.3) | |||
| A reaction: If the electrons could merge like water drops, we would be unable to say when they became one object. You can roughly count waves on the sea, but when you seek an exact total, the identity problem intrudes and prevents precise counting. |
| 8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types |
| Full Idea: Criteria of identity never unambiguously determine the kind of objects to which they apply, since many different types of objects can be governed by the same criteria. Cats and dogs share the criterion of identity for animals in general. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3) | |||
| A reaction: So how do you individuate the type of an object? You could identify 'the thing I dug up yesterday' without being able to individuate it. You can individuate 'the cleverest person in Britain' without being able to identify them. |
| 8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence |
| Full Idea: What really makes for the diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time location, from which their difference in component matter at any time merely follows as a consequence. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5) | |||
| A reaction: I daresay this is how we manage to identify the diversity of a pair of tigers (epistemology), but is that what their diversity consists in (ontology)? That they employ different matter seems relevant. If you feed one, the other stays hungry (causation). |
| 8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind |
| Full Idea: A principle of individuation tells us what is to count as one instance of a given kind, such as one ship. A criterion of identity is what makes for the identity or diversity of items of a given kind, to distinguish this ship from that ship. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5) | |||
| A reaction: So individuation picks out type/qualitative identity, and identifying picks out token/numerical identity. This agrees with Idea 7926, but is a shift from the usage Lowe mentions in Idea 8290. Common usage makes the technical terms unclear. |
| 16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects |
| Full Idea: A 'substance' might be defined to be an object which does not depend for its existence upon any other object (where dependency is defined in terms of necessity. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3) | |||
| A reaction: I'm inclined to leave out 'substance', which has too much historical baggage, and talk of minimal things having 'identity', and proper things having 'essence'. |
| 8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? |
| Full Idea: It is not at all clear that the identity of a composite object can be fixed by the identity of its original composition, since there are good grounds for claiming that the reverse is in fact the case. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7.5) | |||
| A reaction: That is, how could you identify the origin if you didn't know what it was that had originated? Nice point. See also Idea 8274. Vicars must make sure they baptise the right baby. |
| 8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times |
| Full Idea: The 'endurance' view is that an object persists by being 'wholly present' at more than one time, and the 'perdurance' view is that an object has different temporal parts which exist at different times. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5) | |||
| A reaction: It is tempting to say that only a philosopher would come up with a view as bizarre as the second one. Trying to imagine God's view of time has led to a lot of confusion. Endurance seems to need substance, so bundle views of objects encourage perdurance. |
| 8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? |
| Full Idea: The temporal parts approach to identity appears to be viciously circular, for how are the 'temporal parts' of tomatoes to be individuated and identified save by reference to the very tomatoes of which they are parts? | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5.3) | |||
| A reaction: (This attacks the 'perdurance' view - Idea 8271) Something wrong here. Isn't Lowe begging the question, by assuming that a tomato at an instant IS the tomato? To know what a tomato is, you must spend time with it. |
| 8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it |
| Full Idea: As Locke clearly understood, one must first have a clear conception of what kind of object one is dealing with in order to extract a criterion of identity for objects of that kind from that conception. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3) | |||
| A reaction: Archaeologist face objects which they can number, remember and take pride in, without having a clue what kind of thing they are dealing with. The two processes may not be entirely distinct. |
| 8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter |
| Full Idea: One venerable tradition, exemplified in Aquinas, has it that matter is the 'principle of individuation', that is, that all that can be guaranteed to distinguish two concrete thing of the same kind is the different matter of which they are composed. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to be 'identity-conditions' rather than 'individuation', according to Idea 7926. The problem would be how to identify that particular matter, apart from its composing that particular object. Replacing planks on a ship seems unimportant. |
| 15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws |
| Full Idea: I can accept 'conceptual' necessity, as long as it is only identified with 'narrow' logical necessity. For I take it that the 'conceptually' necessary is that which is true solely in virtue of concepts together with the laws of logic. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.4) | |||
| A reaction: In the narrow version of logical necessity (Idea 8260) some definitions are required in addition to the mere laws of logic. This implies that the concepts are dependent of definitions, which is a bit restrictive. Aren't we allowed undefined concepts? |
| 16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' |
| Full Idea: Lowe (1998) defines metaphysical necessity in terms of logical necessity 'broadly contrued'. | |||
| From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998]) by Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM - The Impossibility of Superdupervenience n 3 | |||
| A reaction: [I seem to have missed this simple thought in Lowe 1998 - must revisit]. Both metaphysical and logical necessity can be taken as 'true in all possible worlds', but that doesn't make them the same truths. |
| 8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) |
| Full Idea: 'Strict' logical necessity is true by the laws of logic alone; 'narrow' logical necessity is true by the laws of logic plus definitions of non-logical terms; 'broad' logical necessity is true in every possible world where the laws of logic hold. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.4) | |||
| A reaction: Lowe then says the third is close to 'metaphysical' necessity. I am unable to distinguish the third from the first. You can't claim that a logical implication holds in this world, but not in another possible world which has the same rules of implication. |
| 16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit |
| Full Idea: What is 'metaphysically' possible hinges …on the question of whether acceptable metaphysical principles and categories permit the existence of some state of affairs. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3) | |||
| A reaction: Lowe breezes along with confident assertions like this. I once heard Kit Fine tease him for over-confidence. All you do is work out 'acceptable' principles and categories, and you've cracked it! |
| 8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? |
| Full Idea: Possible worlds, conceived of as abstracta, surely exist 'in every possible world'. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12) | |||
| A reaction: A possible very infinite regress, if a particular possible world is distinguished from another only by being perceived from Actual Word 1 or Actual World 2.. How many possible worlds are there? The standard answer is 'lots', rather than infinity. |
| 8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change |
| Full Idea: Although the appearance of distance and so of space may conceivably be no more than an appearance (as Berkeley held), the appearance of change and so of time cannot be no more than appearance - for the appearance of change involves change (in minds). | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7.9) | |||
| A reaction: This would seem to place some sort of limit on idealism. Since it doesn't offer a barrier to solipsism, though, it is not much consolation. We mustn't forget that Parmenides and Zeno of Elea proved that change is just an illusion. |
| 8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual |
| Full Idea: I consider properties or qualities to be essentially adjectival rather than objectual in nature (and the same applies to relations, though they are adjectival to more than one object). | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7.1) | |||
| A reaction: Personally I am inclined to say that properties are either real causal powers (functions of objects?), such as being sharp, or else they are subjective ways of distinguishing things (e.g. colours). Or fictions. 'Adjectival' is too vague. |
| 8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted |
| Full Idea: The vulgar notion, propagated by some modern physicalist philosophers, that Cartesian souls are supposed to be made of some sort of ghostly, 'immaterial' stuff - a near contradiction in terms - is quite unwarranted. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5) | |||
| A reaction: A nice illustration of the service which can be offered by this database. See Idea 3423 for an illustration of the sort of thing which Lowe is attacking. See Idea 5011 for a quotation from Descartes on the subject. I leave the decision with my visitor... |
| 8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts |
| Full Idea: There are three conceptions of abstractness: 1) non-spatial entities, the opposite of 'concrete' (e.g. numbers and universals); 2) an entity logically incapable of a separate existence (e.g. an apple's colour); 3) Fregean abstractions from concepts. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.1) | |||
| A reaction: [Lowe p.218 explains the third one] Lowe rejects the third one, and it is a moot point whether the second one could actually be classed as an entity (do they have identity-conditions?), so the big issue is the first one. |
| 8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable |
| Full Idea: Although one can separate 'in thought' a direction from any line of which it is the direction, one cannot conceive of a direction existing in the absence of any line possessing that direction. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3) | |||
| A reaction: Intriguing. If I ask you to imagine a line going in a certain direction, don't you need the direction before you can think of the line? 'That line is going in the wrong direction'. Maybe abstract ideas only exist 'in thought'. Lowe is a realist here. |
| 8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects |
| Full Idea: Philosophers who have advocated facts as being causal relata have confused them with states, such as a stone's being heavy; they are guilty of confusing states of affairs with states of objects. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.3) | |||
| A reaction: A state of an object can be individuated rather more precisely than a fact or state of affairs. There are, of course, vast numbers of states of objects, but only a few states of affairs, involved in (say) the fall of the Berlin Wall. |
| 8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them |
| Full Idea: Points are limits of parts of space, in which case parts of space cannot be aggregates of them. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 3.9) | |||
| A reaction: To try to build space out of points (how many per cc?) is fairly obviously asking for trouble, but Lowe articulates nicely why it is a non-starter. |