Ideas from 'The Correspondence Theory of Truth' by D.J. O'Connor [1975], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Correspondence Theory of Truth' by O'Connor,D.J. [Hutchinson 1975,0-09-123201-5]].

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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers

3745	Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth?

			Full Idea: Maybe a sentence is not a candidate for truth until it is used to make a statement.
			From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth

3742	Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs

			Full Idea: Our beliefs must claim a correspondence with facts, and then the verbal expression of the belief must correspond to the belief itself.
			From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.4)

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth

3744	The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions

			Full Idea: The Semantic Theory of truth requires that sentences are truth-bearers (rather than statements, or propositions).
			From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)

3749	What does 'true in English' mean?

			Full Idea: We do not seem to have any use in ordinary discourse for phrases like 'true in English', 'false in German'.
			From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], II.1)

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic

3746	Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences

			Full Idea: If sentences can have truth-values only when they occur as asserted, it would be impossible to have a truth-functional basis to logic.
			From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

3747	Events are fast changes which are of interest to us

			Full Idea: The standard cases of events are physical changes which happen sufficiently fast to be observed as changes, and which are of sufficient interest to us to be noticed or commented on.
			From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.7)

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs

3748	Without language our beliefs are particular and present

			Full Idea: Without language we would be restricted to particular beliefs about the here and now.
			From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.8)

3743	We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them

			Full Idea: It is only when beliefs are given some symbolic expression that they acquire the precision and stability that enables us to entertain them.
			From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.5)