Ideas from 'Daniel Dennett on himself' by Daniel C. Dennett [1994], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind' (ed/tr Guttenplan,Samuel) [Blackwell 1995,0-631-19996-9]].

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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware
                        Full Idea: The 'intentional stance' is the tactic of interpreting an entity by adopting the presupposition that it is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent.
                        From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
                        A reaction: This is Dennett's 'instrumentalism', a descendant of behaviourism, which strikes me as a pragmatist's evasion of the ontological problems of mind which should interest philosophers
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence
                        Full Idea: Like such abstracta as centres of gravity and parallelograms of force, the beliefs and desires posited by the highest intentional stance have no independent and concrete existence.
                        From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
                        A reaction: I don't see why we shouldn't one day have a physical account of the distinctive brain events involved in a belief or a desire
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role
                        Full Idea: All attributions of content are founded on an appreciation of the functional roles of the items in question.
                        From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
                        A reaction: This seems wrong to me. How can anything's nature be its function? It must have intrinsic characteristics in order to have the function. This is an evasion.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learning is evolution in the brain
                        Full Idea: Learning is evolution in the brain.
                        From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.238)
                        A reaction: This is a rather non-conscious, associationist view, connected to Dawkins' idea of 'memes'. It seems at least partially correct.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature
                        Full Idea: Biology is not a science like physics, in which one should strive to find 'laws of nature', but a species of engineering.
                        From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
                        A reaction: Yes. This is also true of chemistry, which has always struck me as minitiarised car mechanics.