PhilosophyIdeas.com Database     |     Current Total Ideas: 22,104     |     home     |     back

Ideas from 'A Theory of Universals' by David M. Armstrong [1978], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Properties' (ed/tr Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A) [OUP 1997,0-19-875176-1]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     unexpand these ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15544 If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic
                        Full Idea: Armstrong says what is actual (namely a certain roster of universals) might have been impossible. Hence his modal logic is S4, without the 'Brouwersche Axiom'.
                        From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by David Lewis - Armstrong on combinatorial possibility 'The demand'
                        A reaction: So p would imply possibly-not-possibly-p.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
7024 Properties are universals, which are always instantiated
                        Full Idea: Armstrong takes properties to be universals, and believes there are no 'uninstantiated' universals.
                        From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §9.3
                        A reaction: At first glance this, like many theories of universals, seems to invite Ockham's Razor. If they are always instantiated, perhaps we should perhaps just try to talk about the instantiations (i.e. tropes), and skip the universal?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates
                        Full Idea: Armstrong says all properties are categorical, but a dispositional predicate may denote such a property; the dispositional predicate denotes the categorical property in virtue of the dispositional role it happens, contingently, to play in this world.
                        From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1
                        A reaction: I favour the fundamentality of the dispositional rather than the categorical. The world consists of powers, and we find ourselves amidst their categorical expressions. I could be persuaded otherwise, though!
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
10729 Universals explain resemblance and causal power
                        Full Idea: Armstrong thinks universals play two roles, namely grounding objective resemblances and grounding causal powers.
                        From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11
                        A reaction: Personally I don't think universals explain anything at all. They just add another layer of confusion to a difficult problem. Oliver objects that this seems a priori, contrary to Armstrong's principle in Idea 10728.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4031 It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property
                        Full Idea: I suggest that we reject the notion that just because the predicate 'red' applies to an open class of particulars, therefore there must be a property, redness.
                        From: David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], p.8), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §6
                        A reaction: At last someone sensible (an Australian) rebuts that absurd idea that our ontology is entirely a feature of our language
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
10024 The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction
                        Full Idea: Armstrong conflates the type-token distinction with that between universals and particulars.
                        From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], xiii,16/17) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic 147 n23
                        A reaction: This seems quite reasonable, even if you don’t believe in the reality of universals. I'm beginning to think we should just use the term 'general' instead of 'universal'. 'Type' also seems to correspond to 'set', with the 'token' as the 'member'.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori
                        Full Idea: Armstrong says that if it can be proved a priori that a thing falls under a certain universal, then there is no such universal - and hence there is no universal of a thing being identical with itself.
                        From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], II p.11) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11
                        A reaction: This is a distinctively Armstrongian view, based on his belief that universals must be instantiated, and must be discoverable a posteriori, as part of science. I'm baffled by self-identity, but I don't think this argument does the job.