Ideas from 'Phil Applications of Cognitive Science' by Alvin I. Goldman [1993], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science' by Goldman,Alvin I. [Westview 1993,0-8133-8040-5]].

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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count
                        Full Idea: It has been proposed (on the basis of observations) that young children have three innate principles of counting - one-to-one correspondence of number to item, stable order for numbers, and cardinality (which labels the nth item counted).
                        From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.60)
                        A reaction: I like the idea of observed patterns as central (which is the one-to-one principle). But the other two principles are plausible, and show why pure empiricism won't work.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count
                        Full Idea: Rats can determine the number of times they have pressed a lever up to at least twenty-four presses,…and can consistently turn down the fifth tunnel on the left in a maze.
                        From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.58)
                        A reaction: This seems to encourage an empirical view of maths (pattern recognition?) rather than a Platonic one. Or numbers are innate in rat brains?
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories
                        Full Idea: Infant behaviour implies inbuilt ontological categories of thing, place, event, path, action, sound, manner, amount and number. ...There is an algebra of relationships between them.
                        From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.109)
                        A reaction: Interesting. We would expect the categories in infant brains to have instrumental value, but we don't have to accept them as true. Adults (even Aristotle) are big infants.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes
                        Full Idea: An elephant may be fully represented by nine primitive shapes ('geons'), but it may require as few as three geons in appropriate relations to be correctly identified.
                        From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.7)
                        A reaction: Encouraging the idea of the mind as a maker of maps and models
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable
                        Full Idea: A unique yellow experience may be evoked with monochrome light of 580nm, or a mixture of 540nm and 670nm. ..Our interpretation of colour experience is a highly idiosyncratic artefact of our visual system.
                        From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.117)
                        A reaction: This confirms what I have always thought - that colour (as qualia) is strictly a feature of minds, not of the world.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles
                        Full Idea: Gestalt psychology claims that there are at least four unlearned factors in perceptual grouping - the principles of proximity (close things), of similarity, of good continuation (extending lines in a smooth course), and closure (which completes figures).
                        From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.103)
                        A reaction: This offers a bridge between Hume's associationism and rationalist claims of innate ideas