Ideas from 'Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes' by Paul M. Churchland [1981], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mind and Cognition (2nd Edn)' (ed/tr Lycan,William) [Blackwell 1999,0-631-20545-4]].

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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false
                        Full Idea: It may well be that completed neuroscience will not include a reduction of folk psychology, but why should that be a reason to regard it as false? It would only be a reason if irreducibility entailed that they could not possibly both be true.
                        From: comment on Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981]) by Robert Kirk - Mind and Body 3.9
                        A reaction: If all our behaviour had been explained by a future neuro-science, this might not falsify folk psychology, but it would totally marginalise it. It is still possible that dewdrops are placed on leaves by fairies, but this is no longer a hot theory.
Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced
                        Full Idea: Eliminative materialism says our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena is a radically false theory, so defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced (rather than reduced).
                        From: Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981], Intro)
                        A reaction: It is hard to see what you could replace the idea of a 'belief' with in ordinary conversation. We may reduce beliefs to neuronal phenomena, but we can't drop the vocabulary of the macro-phenomena. The physics of weather doesn't eliminate 'storms'.