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| 4059 | It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life |
| Full Idea: It cannot seriously be thought to be murder if a mother performs an abortion on herself to save her own life (if, say, she had a serious heart condition). | |||
| From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.127) | |||
| A reaction: An extreme view might condemn such an action, but it can hardly be based on the 'sanctity of life'. |
| 4060 | The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life |
| Full Idea: Having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person's body. | |||
| From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.131) | |||
| A reaction: A very nice point. You have a right to your life once you are the sole owner of it. |
| 4061 | The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly |
| Full Idea: Maybe the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but in the right not to be killed unjustly. | |||
| From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.131) | |||
| A reaction: Sounds tautological. There is no right to life, then, but just the requirement that people behave justly? |
| 4062 | No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months |
| Full Idea: No one is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, and other interests and commitments, for nine months, in order to keep another person alive. | |||
| From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.135) | |||
| A reaction: It is a trade-off. It might become a duty if society (or even a husband) urgently needed the baby. |
| 4057 | A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree |
| Full Idea: A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree. | |||
| From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.125) | |||
| A reaction: This relies heavily on the philosopher's concept of a 'person', but it seems right to me. |
| 4695 | Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights |
| Full Idea: Thomson suggests that abortion can be justified without the need to deny that the foetus has the moral rights of a human person. | |||
| From: report of Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971]) by Philippa Foot - Killing and Letting Die p.86 | |||
| A reaction: Thomson uses a dubious analogy between pregnancy and being hooked up to someone for life-support. Presumably killing an innocent person is occasionally justifiable, but the situation would normally be more abnormal than pregnancy. |
| 4696 | The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. |
| Full Idea: A fetus is not in jeopardy because it is in the womb, so an abortion originates the fatal sequence, and the mother is the agent. Hence Thomson's argument is invalid, and we must return to question of the moral status of the foetus. | |||
| From: comment on Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971]) by Philippa Foot - Killing and Letting Die p.86 | |||
| A reaction: The problem would be if a 'person' was safe, but only if I continue some sustained effort which is not required of me by normal duties. |
| 4058 | Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? |
| Full Idea: Can we say that a person has a right to life only if they didn't come into existence through rape, or that the latter have less right to life? | |||
| From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.126) | |||
| A reaction: This would clearly be an inconsistency for some opponents of abortion who allow rape as an exception. |