Ideas from 'The Internalist Conception of Justification' by Alvin I. Goldman [1980], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism' (ed/tr Kornblith,Hilary) [Blackwell 2001,0-631-22106-9]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant
                        Full Idea: If mere consistency is our aim in achieving a coherent set of beliefs, then new evidence and experiments are irrelevant.
                        From: Alvin I. Goldman (The Internalist Conception of Justification [1980], §VIII)
                        A reaction: An important reminder. What epistemic duty requires us to attend to anomalous observations, instead of sweeping them under the carpet?