Ideas from 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge' by Laurence Bonjour [1980], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism' (ed/tr Kornblith,Hilary) [Blackwell 2001,0-631-22106-9]].

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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner
                        Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says that for 100 tickets and one winner, each ticket has a .99 likelihood of defeat, so they are all likely to lose, so there is unlikely to be a winner.
                        From: report of Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], ž5) by PG - Db (ideas)
                        A reaction: The problem seems to be viewing each ticket in isolation. If I buy two tickets, I increase my chances of winning.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism
                        Full Idea: Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism.
                        From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], Intro)
                        A reaction: I don't see why there shouldn't be a phenomenalist, anti-realist version of externalism, which just has 'starting points' instead of a serious commitment to foundations.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible
                        Full Idea: The fundamental question that must be answered by any acceptable version of foundationalism is: how are basic beliefs possible?
                        From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], žI)
                        A reaction: This question seems to be asking for a justification for basic beliefs, which smacks of 'Who made God?' Look, basic beliefs are just basic, right?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism
                        Full Idea: The central argument for foundationalism is simply that all other possible outcomes of the regress of justifications lead inexorably to scepticism.
                        From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], žI)
                        A reaction: If you prefer coherence to foundations, you need the security of reason to assess the coherence (which seems to be an internal foundation!).
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
                        Full Idea: The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question.
                        From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], žII)
                        A reaction: The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational
                        Full Idea: External or objective reliability is not enough to offset subjective irrationality (such as unexplained clairvoyance).
                        From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], žIV)
                        A reaction: A good argument. Where do animals fit into this? If your clairvoyance kept working, in the end you might concede that you 'knew', even though you were baffled about how you managed it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria
                        Full Idea: It may be that where there are no positive grounds for a charge of irrationality, the acceptance of a belief with only external justification is still subjectively irrational in a sense that rules out its being epistemologically justified.
                        From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], žIV)
                        A reaction: A key objection. Surely rational behaviour requires a judgement to be made before a belief is accepted? If you are consistently clairvoyant, you must ask why.