Ideas from 'Causation and Explanation' by Stathis Psillos [2002], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Causation and Explanation' by Psillos,Stathis [Acumen 2002,1-902683-42-0]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     unexpand these ideas


2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons
                        Full Idea: The traditional conception of Reason is that all beliefs should be justified (that is, backed up by reasons) in order to be rational.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6)
                        A reaction: I think it is the duty of all philosophers to either defend this traditional view, or quit philosophy for some other activity. Rorty suggests hermeneutics. In a democracy, rulers should be continually required to give reasons for their decisions.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added
                        Full Idea: Valid deductive arguments have the property of monotonicity; if the conclusion Q follows from the premises P, then it will also follow if further premises P* are added to P.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §9.2.1)
                        A reaction: For perversity's sake we could add a new premise which contradicted one of the original ones ('Socrates is a god'). Or one premise could be 'I believe..', and the new one could show that the belief was false. Induction is non-monotonic.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist
                        Full Idea: The move from what can (or cannot) be known to exist to what does (or does not) exist has been dubbed the 'epistemic fallacy'.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6)
                        A reaction: This should be a standard concept in all philosophical discussion. It is the commonest, simplest, and most profound blunder made by philosophers, and they do it all the time.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it
                        Full Idea: There can be predictions without explanations, as when a barometer successfully predicts storms, but on its own it does not explain them.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.8)
                        A reaction: Actually, barometers contribute to explanations. A reasonable predictor might offer no explanation ('if he's out, she's probably out too'), but an infallible predictor is almost certain to involve causation, which helps a lot in explanation.
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction
                        Full Idea: There can be explanations without predictions, as when we explain a previous position of Mars from its present one, plus a law.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.9)
                        A reaction: If we don't mind stretching the word, I think we can 'predict' the past, as where I predict the location of an Egyptian tomb from my study of papyruses.
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises
                        Full Idea: Unlike deductive arguments, induction is non-monotonic - that is, it can be invalidated by the addition of new premises.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §9.2.1)
                        A reaction: This is a fancy way of stating the obvious, which is that induction is not a type of deduction. Hume is sometimes accused of this false assumption. Presumably induction is rational, even if it is not actually logical.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations
                        Full Idea: The three types of explanation are 'epistemic' (the event is expectable because of a law), or 'modal' (the event is necessary because of a law), or 'ontic' (it is shown how the event fits into the world's causal structure).
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §11.1)
                        A reaction: Prediction, necessity or causes. It is hard to think of any other way to explain something. Presumably you would exclude necessities if you didn't believe in them. Hume would go for prediction, on the basis of regularities. Personally, I want it all.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law
                        Full Idea: Explanation has to do with understanding; just citing a cause would not offer an adequate understanding, unless it was accompanied by the citation of a law that connects the two events.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2)
                        A reaction: It is surely undeniable that being told the cause but not the law will increase our understanding. Understanding and explanation come in degrees. Full understanding would require an explanation of the law, and beyond. Any relevant truth helps.
The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events
                        Full Idea: The 'deductive-nomological' model became known as the 'covering law model': its main thesis is that laws and only laws adequately explain the occurrence of singular events.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2)
                        A reaction: But presumably you need other events to derive a law, so you could say that a singular event can only be explained if it isn't singular. A regularity pattern would offer a partial explanation, before any law had been derived.
If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole
                        Full Idea: If we use geometry and optics to explain the length of shadow cast by a flag-pole, this seems to be reversible, so that the shadow will explain the length of the pole.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.5)
                        A reaction: A neat example which presumably implies that an explanation must involve temporal statements. The laws of physics are totally reversible in time, and so will not suffice to explain events on their own. Time's arrow becomes an axiom of explanation?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations
                        Full Idea: There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
                        A reaction: A crucial basic point, which must be drummed into the minds of ruthless Quinean naturalists, who want to explain everything by quarks and electrons
An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink
                        Full Idea: Knocking over an ink bottle explains the stain on the carpet, and it is not in doubt because you cannot quote the laws involved; a 'causal story' can give a complete explanation without a law.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.6)
                        A reaction: But why is he so clumsy, and the bottle so unstable? Was it really (Freudian) an 'accident'? There is no end to complete explanation. But 'I was clumsy this once' and 'I am always clumsy' are equally good explanations.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner
                        Full Idea: Some philosophers focus on the so-called 'pragmatics of explanation' - that an explanation is an answer to a 'why' question, and the relevant answer will depend on the presuppositions or interests of the questioner.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
                        A reaction: This seems to me right. Explanation is an entirely human business, not a feature of nature, and most explanations will track back to the big bang if you have the patience, but they always terminate because of pragmatic considerations. But fobbing off?
An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event
                        Full Idea: An explanation amounts to the removal of the initial surprise that accompanied the occurrence of the event.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2)
                        A reaction: This is a nice simple point. It makes explanation relative. God requires no explanations, small children require many. The implication is that explanations make events predictable, which means they must either offer inductive generalisations, or laws.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind
                        Full Idea: There is a problem if causation is the object of our analysis, but is also presupposed (as an empirical principle of human psychology) for the functioning of the mind.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.7)
                        A reaction: This doesn't sound like a major problem. If it is, it is presumably impossible to analyse the mind, because a mind is presupposed in the process of analysis.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion
                        Full Idea: Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.8)
                        A reaction: This is the core of Hume's is/ought claim - what he calls the mind 'spreading itself'. It is a powerful claim. Personally I think we have become TOO sceptical here, and have the delusion that crucial features of nature are created within our minds.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence
                        Full Idea: The platitudes of causation are that 1) causes make a difference (counterfactually or probabilistically), 2) causes are recipes for events, 3) causes explain their effects, and 4) causes are evidence for effects.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
                        A reaction: A nice piece of analysis which offers some problems for anyone (like Russell) who wants to analyse causation completely out of our conceptual scheme.
Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties
                        Full Idea: While Humeans base their theories on the intuition of regularity, their opponents base theirs on the intuition that there is an intrinsic relation between the properties of two particular things involved (like a hammer and a vase).
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
                        A reaction: I favour the intrinsic relation of properties view, but this leaves the question of whether we can explain a relation, apart from observing the regularities associated with the properties.
We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round
                        Full Idea: We cannot distinguish between good and bad explanations of some phenomena, unless we first distinguish between causal and non-causal explanations.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
                        A reaction: This seems right, but it pushes us towards the idea that causation is non-analysable, and must be taken as a metaphysically basic axiom. If naturalistic accounts fail, that may be only alternative.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive
                        Full Idea: The three ways to divide theories on causation are: between generalist and singularist, between intrinsic and extrinsic characterisations of the causal relationship, and between reductive and non-reductive approaches.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5)
                        A reaction: Okay. I vote for singularist, intrinsic and reductive. I'm guessing that that pushes me towards Salmon and Dowe's theory of the 'transfer of conserved quantities', which is certainly reductive, doesn't need regularities in the events, and seems intrinsic.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect
                        Full Idea: If causation is taken to be an 'intrinsic' relation, then that c causes e will have to depend entirely on the properties of c and e, and the relations between c and e.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.2)
                        A reaction: This view would move us towards 'essentialism', that the essences of objects produce the events and the laws, rather than external imposed forces and laws.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law
                        Full Idea: The logical empiricists (esp. Hempel) analysed the concept of causation in terms of causal explanation, and analysed the latter as a species of deductive argument, with one premises stating a universal law (the so-called Deductive-Nomological model).
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
                        A reaction: This feels wrong, as deduction seems insufficiently naturalistic, and the assumption of a law as premise seems to beg heaps of questions.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession
                        Full Idea: If counterfactual claims can be made about causation, this suggests that there is more to it than mere regular succession.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §2.2)
                        A reaction: Interesting. Even Hume makes counterfactual claims in his first definition of cause, and all claims of causation seem to go beyond the immediate evidence.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
"All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law
                        Full Idea: The statement "all gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" seems to have all the features demanded of a lawlike statement, yet it can hardly be said to express a law. It is a merely true universal generalisation.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §5.3)
                        A reaction: Nice example. A trickier case is "all cubes of uranium are smaller than one cubic mile", which sounds like part of a law. It suggests a blurred borderline between the two. How much gold is there in the universe? Is that fact a natural necessity?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity
                        Full Idea: It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
                        A reaction: Good example, but it doesn't demolish the regularity view. We should come to conscious minds last. There aren't many other unfailing regularities that are not laws.
Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation
                        Full Idea: A rather important objection to Humeanism has been that regularity is not sufficient for causation.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
                        A reaction: Obviously a crucial problem, but the Humean view can defend itself by introducing other constant conjunctions. We don't observe events in isolation, but as part of a pattern of regularities.
A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts
                        Full Idea: The Humean view depends on the conjunction of two general theses: first, causation is tied to regularity; secondly, causal facts supervene on non-causal facts.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4)
                        A reaction: If causation is just regularities, this means it is patterns observed by us, which means causation doesn't actually exist. So Hume is wrong. Singular causation is possible, and needs explanation.
The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it
                        Full Idea: A regularity can be used to predict a future event irrespective of whether it is deemed causal or not. A farmer can predict that dawn has broken on hearing the cock's crow.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.1)
                        A reaction: This seems a highly significant criticism of any view that says regularity leads to causation, which is the basis of induction, which leads to counterfactual claims, and thus arrives a the laws of nature.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities
                        Full Idea: In the 'web-of-laws' approach, laws are those regularities that are members of a coherent system of regularities, in particular, a system that can be represented as a deductive axiomatic system, striking a good balance between simplicity and strength.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §5.6)
                        A reaction: Psillos attribute this view to Mill, Ramsey and Lewis. It is the obvious candidate for a fully developed Humean empiricist system, where regularities reinforce one another. I think laws are found in mechanisms, not in regularities, which are symptoms.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties
                        Full Idea: Many philosophers will find dispositional essentialism unappealing, not least because it seems to fail to explain how (and in virtue of what) there is this supposed fundamental distinction between essential and non-essential properties.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002])
                        A reaction: Maybe there is no precise definition, but any idiot can see that some properties of gold are essential (mass) and others non-essential (attractive to jackdaws). It's a fair question, but is this the strongest objection to essentialism?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent
                        Full Idea: In "had the acrobat jumped, there would have been a safety net" the antecedent of the counterfactual (the jumping) is temporally later than the consequent (the installation of the net).
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §3.3)
                        A reaction: This blocks anyone (e.g. David Lewis) who tries to define counterfactual claims entirely in terms of a condition followed by a consequence. Nice example.
Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur
                        Full Idea: The counterfactual theory is a non-Humean relation between singular events; the thought is that causation makes a difference - to say that c causes e is to say that if c hadn't occurred, e wouldn't have occurred either.
                        From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4)
                        A reaction: Helpful. I'm beginning to think that this theory is wrong. It gives an account of how we see causation, and a test for it, but it says nothing about what causation actually is.