Ideas from 'Metaphysics: contemporary introduction' by Michael J. Loux [1998], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction' by Loux,Michael J. [Routledge 2000,0-415-14034-x]].

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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical
                        Full Idea: If trope theorists say abstract singular terms name sets of tropes, what is the referent of 'is a unicorn'? The only candidate is the null set (with no members), but there is just one null set, so 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' will be identical.
                        From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.86)
                        A reaction: Not crucial, I would think, given that a unicorn is just a horse with a horn. Hume explains how we do that, combining ideas which arose from actual tropes.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Universals come in hierarchies of generality
                        Full Idea: Universals come in hierarchies of generality.
                        From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.24)
                        A reaction: If it is possible to state facts about universals, this obviously encourages a rather Platonic approach to them, as existent things with properties. But maybe the hierarchies are conventional, not natural.
Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability
                        Full Idea: Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability.
                        From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.60)
                        A reaction: Plato's view seems to be that we don't identify universals independently. We ascend The Line, or think about the shadows in The Cave, and infer the universals from an array of particulars (by dialectic).
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive
                        Full Idea: In return for a one-category ontology (with particulars but no universals), the austere nominalist is forced to take a whole host of things (like being red, or triangular, or human) as unanalysable or primitive.
                        From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.68)
                        A reaction: I see that 'red' might have to be primitive, but being human can just be a collection of particulars. It is no ontologically worse to call them 'primitive' than to say they exist.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'.
                        Full Idea: Nominalists have been very concerned to provide an account of the role of abstract singular terms (such as 'circularity').
                        From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.34)
                        A reaction: Whether this is a big problem depends on our view of abstraction. If it only consists of selecting one property of an object and reifying it, then we can give a nominalist account of properties, and the problem is solved.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity
                        Full Idea: Any account of the identity of material objects which turns on the identity of places and times must face the objection that the identity of places and times depends, in turn, on the identities of the objects located at them.
                        From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.56)
                        A reaction: This may be a benign circle, in which we concede that there are two basic interdependent concepts of objects and space-time. If you want to define identity - in terms of what?