Ideas from 'The Will to Power (notebooks)' by Friedrich Nietzsche [1888], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Will to Power' by Nietzsche,Friedrich (ed/tr Kaufmann,W /Hollingdate,R) [Vintage 1968,0-394-70437-1]].

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony
                        Full Idea: The wisest man would be the one richest in contradictions, who has, as it were, antennae for all types of men - as well as his great moments of grand harmony - a rare accident even in us!
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §259)
                        A reaction: By 'us' does he mean himself? Whether the rest of us thought such a person to be wise would depend on whether we met them on a contradictory or a harmonious day. Permanent harmony should be viewed with suspicion.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants
                        Full Idea: I do not wish to persuade anyone to philosophy: it is inevitable, it perhaps also desirable, that the philosopher should be a rare plant.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §420)
                        A reaction: My immediate reaction is disagreement, but 'what if everybody' became a philosopher. The fear is that philosophy paralyses action, but it need not. Good philosophy is time-consuming. History would come to an end. The excitement of medieval history!
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective?
                        Full Idea: Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective?
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §560)
                        A reaction: A reasonable speculation. I begin to feel my opinions are objective if they are reinforced by the agreement of others. One can believe in the facts, but despair of objectivity. It is called 'scepticism'. Buf cf. T.Nagel.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal
                        Full Idea: Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §515)
                        A reaction: Call me narrow-minded, prejudiced and arrogant, but I just don't believe this. Rational minds meet across cultures, and good reasons can rise above culture. However, I may be wrong about this…
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth
                        Full Idea: What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §431)
                        A reaction: He admits that some things can be demonstrated, and that they have some worth. But demonstration may be a matter of coherence, so that anything can be demonstrated, by assuming a range of ideas as being beyond demonstration.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity'
                        Full Idea: We are unable to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective empirical law, not the expression of any 'necessity', but only an inability.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §516)
                        A reaction: A remarkable claim, made by someone utterly gripped by relativism. I don't believe it. Why can't we do it? We experience it as a truth, not as a prejudice or mental block. I say it reflects reality - there is only one set of facts.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Everything simple is merely imaginary
                        Full Idea: Everything simple is merely imaginary.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §536)
                        A reaction: A wonderful aphorism. This is one's worst fear, which is why it is suggested that ontological O's R is bad, though epistemological O's R ('be cautious') is fine. I have to admit that I have no idea whether reality is simple.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source
                        Full Idea: Among the forces cultivated by morality was truthfulness: this eventually turned against morality, discovered its teleology, its partial perspective.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §015)
                        A reaction: Just as 'duty' is said to have withered in modern times, because its religious underpinning has been lost, so this gives an account of the decline of the value of truth. It is still left to us to assert the value of truth, perhaps as the only value.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations
                        Full Idea: 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §517)
                        A reaction: I suspect that this is a nice explanation of why we value truth, but says nothing at all about what truth actually is. I can't think of a better explanation of why we value truth.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Only because there is thought is there untruth
                        Full Idea: Only because there is thought is there untruth.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §574)
                        A reaction: A nicely oblique place to start in one's study of truth. Untruth is a very human contribution to the world, making virtually no sense of animal thought. Meta-thought seems to be required.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
True beliefs are those which augment one's power
                        Full Idea: For Nietzsche, the true belief is the one which augments one's power.
                        From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13
                        A reaction: Sounds suspiciously like pragmatism. Sounds suspiciously unlike truth as we know it. So many philosophers seem to me to confuse the concept of the truth itself with the ability of humans grasp the truth, or be interested in it. Truth is not part of us.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying
                        Full Idea: What is true? Where an explanation is given which causes us the minimum of spiritual effort (moreover, lying is very exhausting).
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §279)
                        A reaction: Nietzsche is just being naughty here. Obviously lazy but intelligent people tell the truth, but to suggest that there is nothing more to truth means the collapse of language and thought. Which means no more reading Nietzsche…
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations
                        Full Idea: An isolated judgement is never 'true', never knowledge; only in connection and relation of many judgements is there any surety.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §530)
                        A reaction: It actually seems impossible to state an isolated judgement in language without having a mass of presuppositions and beliefs to support it. I don't think the full holistic thesis about language follows, however.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist
                        Full Idea: We need 'unities' in order to be able to reckon: that does not mean we must suppose that such unities exist.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §635)
                        A reaction: True. I takes this thought to be important in the Psychology of Metaphysics (an unfashionable branch).
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created
                        Full Idea: Logic (like geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious entities that we have created.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §516)
                        A reaction: This finds Nietzsche on the relativist wing of logical empiricism. The thing is, fictitious entities can have a close relationship with truth, as in a great novel. I believe in necessary logical truth, but there are many ways of slicing it.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming
                        Full Idea: The doctrine of being, of things, of all sorts of fixed unities is a hundred times easier than the doctrine of becoming, of development.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §238)
                        A reaction: I don't know if he intended it, but this is a fierce shaft hurled at Aristotle, who gives a wonderful essentialist account of the nature of things, but can offer nothing more on becoming than the doctrine of potentiality and actuality.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations
                        Full Idea: Against positivism, which halts at phenomena, and says "there are only facts", I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §481)
                        A reaction: A cornerstone of relativism is the denial of facts. A cornerstone of realism is the affirmation of facts. Personally, I affirm facts.
There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts'
                        Full Idea: There are no 'facts-in-themselves', for a sense must always be projected into them before they can be 'facts'.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §556)
                        A reaction: The relativist (and anti-realist) view. Any attempt at taking this proposal seriously induces a hopeless vertigo, a well known consequence of reading Nietzsche. I don't believe this. It is not to my taste.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction
                        Full Idea: The faith in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism; we have measured the value of the world according to categories that refer to a purely fictitious world.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §12B)
                        A reaction: Presumably this refers to Kant, whose dogmatic assertions about the structure of human reason are as open to objection as those of Freud. Nietzsche may have a very profound truth here.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing
                        Full Idea: There comes a point where one realises that what one calls a property of a thing is a sensation of the feeling subject; at this point the property ceases to belong to the thing.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §562)
                        A reaction: I don't believe this. Has Nietzsche no theory about WHY we have one sensation rather than another? I prefer to distinguish primary from secondary qualities.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things'
                        Full Idea: The properties of a thing are effects on other 'things'; if one removes other 'things', then a thing has no properties.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §557)
                        A reaction: This is a causal theory of properties. A counterexample is a potential property, like a bomb which never explodes.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!)
                        Full Idea: We borrowed the concept of unity from our 'ego' concept - our oldest article of faith. If we did not hold ourselves to be unified, we would never have formed the concept 'thing'. Now, somewhat late, we are convinced that the ego does not guarantee unity.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §635)
                        A reaction: Nietzsche tells a similar story about the emergence and subsequent undermining of truth. I am becoming an enthusiast for Nietzsche's account of how our psychology has generated out metaphysics - which doesn't make the metaphysics false.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions
                        Full Idea: The most strongly believed a priori 'truths' are for me provisional assumptions (e.g. the law of causality).
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §497)
                        A reaction: The example of causality would fit in with Humean scepticism, but presumably Nietzsche would also apply it to maths and logic, since he is a thorough-going relativist. I cautiously disagree.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is
                        Full Idea: If we do not know what knowledge is, we cannot possibly answer the question of whether there is knowledge.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §530)
                        A reaction: Obviously Nietzsche is pessimistic about the prospects here, but this is a motto for the whole modern analysis of knowledge, and (besides) we have lots of things (like a concept of identity) which we can't define.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Every belief is a considering-something-true
                        Full Idea: Every belief is a considering-something-true.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §015)
                        A reaction: This is correct, I think, but a little perplexing coming from Nietzsche, who seems to deny objective truth. Presumably we should follow instinct, rather than 'belief'.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing
                        Full Idea: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing (a note for asses).
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §017)
                        A reaction: I hope I am not such an ass that I need Nietzsche to explain this, as I have always thought it true. Many good modern epistemologists seem to me guilty of this error, though. Pragmatists, riff-raff like that…
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief
                        Full Idea: The basic laws of logic (identity and contradiction) are said to be forms of pure knowledge because they precede experience. But these are not forms of knowledge at all! They are regulative articles of belief.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §530)
                        A reaction: This is a standard objection to foundationalism - that the basic beliefs (of reason, or raw experience) are not actually knowledge. We can all speculate about their origin and basis. Personally I think 'truth' must be somewhere in the explanation.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful)
                        Full Idea: It cannot be doubted that all sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful and harmful - consequently, pleasant and unpleasant).
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §505)
                        A reaction: A thesis expanded by Charles Taylor ('Sources of the Self'). This is a very modern view, but also a very Greek view, which slices through the is/ought distinction.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time
                        Full Idea: There is a coarse sensualistic prejudice that sensations teach us truths about things - that I cannot say at the same time that a thing is hard and soft. To say that I cannot have two opposite sensations at the same time is quite coarse and false.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §516)
                        A reaction: I am struggling to think of examples. I might experience something as cool, but judge it to be warm (because my hand is hot). I don't think I know what experience he is referring to. Interesting claim, though.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world
                        Full Idea: The most extreme form of nihilism would be the view that every belief, every considering-something-true, is necessarily false because there is simply no true world. Thus: a perspectival appearance, whose origin lies in us.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §015)
                        A reaction: The idea that 'there is no true world' is incomprehensible to me. But note that here Nietzsche labels this an 'extreme' view, which he may not be asserting. He likes to flirt with danger.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing
                        Full Idea: There is a tremendous blunder in absurdly overestimating consciousness, the transformation of it into a unity, an entity - 'spirit', 'soul', something that feels, thinks, wills.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §529)
                        A reaction: This is a wonderfully modern and scientific view. Even strong materialists still make claims about mental unity, behind which an extravagent and contradictory metaphysics can be hidden. Was Nietzsche, then, an 'eliminativist' about mind?
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind
                        Full Idea: Tremendous self-examination: becoming conscious of oneself, not as an individual but as mankind.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §575)
                        A reaction: A lovely thought, which illustrates the fact that it is hard to be introspective without bringing an agenda to the process.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought
                        Full Idea: The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps we are a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and consciousness, an aristocracy of 'cells' in which dominion resides equally.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §490)
                        A reaction: A nice combination of Humean scepticism, and an anticipation of the modularity of mind. Was Nietzsche thinking about evolution? It goes with his doubts about reason (if we are run by a committee).
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing
                        Full Idea: Everything of which we become conscious is a terminal phenomenon, an end - and causes nothing.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §478)
                        A reaction: This appears to endorse epiphenomenalism - which I take to be an incoherent concept. How can becoming fully aware of something, rather than subliminally or subconsciously aware, make no difference at all? If it exists, it has causal powers.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking
                        Full Idea: The whole conception of an order of rank among the passions: as if it were the right and normal thing to be guided by reason - with the passions as abnormal, dangerous, semi-animal …and nothing other than desires for pleasure.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §387)
                        A reaction: This thought of Nietzsche's seems to be very important, because the Enlightenment relegation of passions was inherited from Christianity, and dominated European culture (and Buddhism too, I think).
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason
                        Full Idea: The misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity and not rather a system of relations between various passions and desires; and as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §387)
                        A reaction: This seems to me a much more accurate account of the relation of reason and passion than almost anything in earlier philosophy (though Aristotle is quite good on it). I am retraining myself to see my mental life in this way.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding
                        Full Idea: There is no such thing as 'will'; it is only a simplifying conception of understanding, as is 'matter'.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §671)
                        A reaction: Nietzsche shares this view with British philosophers such as Hobbes and Bernard Williams. So what is the ontological status of the 'will to power'?
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it
                        Full Idea: There is no such thing as 'willing', but only willing something: one must not remove the aim from the total condition - as epistemologists do. 'Willing' as they understand it is as little a reality as 'thinking': it is a pure fiction.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §668)
                        A reaction: This is parallel to the common modern assertion that emotions also have intentional content, and cannot be understood as having a 'pure' identity.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will
                        Full Idea: Not one of the ancient philosophers had the courage for a theory of the 'unfree will' (i.e. for a theory that denies morality).
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §428)
                        A reaction: The ancients were struck by fate, and by the elusiveness of truth, and Heraclitus said that "character is fate". But Nietzsche seems basically correct.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences
                        Full Idea: "Conscience" was created as an inner voice which does not measure the value of every action with regard to its consequences, but with regard to its intention, and the degree to which this intention conforms with the "laws".
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §141)
                        A reaction: The idea of conscience does seem to preserve moral authority in the absence of gods, but intentions need not only be judged by their obedience to laws.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will
                        Full Idea: There is a logic in all of a great man's activities, hard to survey because of its length .... he has the ability to extend his will across great stretches of his life.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §962 (1885))
                        A reaction: This looks very close to Nietzsche's moral ideal - that one creates a life in impeccable taste, like a great work of art, by deliberately training one's nature, like a gardener. He talks of it as having 'style' in character.
The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives
                        Full Idea: The highest man has the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured. Indeed, when the plant 'man' shows himself strongest one finds instincts that conflict powerfully (e.g. in Shakespeare), but are controlled.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §966)
                        A reaction: Are there some people, perhaps in mental hospitals, who cannot endure or control such things? Do these people have some drives which the rest of us never experience? Do good people only have good drives?
The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia
                        Full Idea: He who determines values and directs the will of millenia by giving direction to the highest natures is the highest man.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §999)
                        A reaction: The second half is the interesting bit. If Ghengis Khan inspires hordes to commit massacres, he certainly creates values, but he hasn't inspired highest natures. So who inspires highest natures? Who are the role models of role models?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art
                        Full Idea: Whose will to power is morality? - Since Socrates there has been a sustained attempt to make moral values dominate over other values, so that they guide living, but also knowledge, the arts, and political and social endeavour.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §274)
                        A reaction: Is the 'will to power' really an explanation? If all human activity is the will to power, then you have to explain the difference between activities. Genocide and altruism are strikingly different manifestations of the will to power.
The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality
                        Full Idea: The basic tendency of the weak and mediocre of all ages is to weaken and pull down the stronger: chief means, the moral judgement.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §345)
                        A reaction: Obviously this contains some truth. Morality is a vast trade union movement by means of which the weak seek power and security. And good luck to them, I say. Why is mass power any worse than aristocratic or oligarchic power?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival
                        Full Idea: All evaluation is made from a definite perspective: that of the preservation of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a faith, a culture.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §259)
                        A reaction: There seems to be a tension over the source of values in Nietzsche. Are they the individualistic visions of an übermensch, or do they arise from the collective pressures of one of these social groups? I suspec that his answer tries to combine them.
The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values
                        Full Idea: What is common to all [the artistic, scientific, religious and moral views]: the ruling drives want to be viewed also as the highest courts of value in general, indeed as creative and ruling powers.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §677)
                        A reaction: An interesting question is whether those four socially dominant forces could reach a consensus on a core of values. And also which value held by one of the groups is viewed as crazy by the other three.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself?
                        Full Idea: What does it mean that the welfare of my neighbour ought to possess for me a higher value than my own? But that my neighbour ought to subordinate his welfare to my welfare?
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §269)
                        A reaction: Interestingly, this is Nietzsche using a Kantian tool to criticise Christian morality. He is pointing out a logical inconsistency. It seems to me an excellent question, though Christians could say it is benignly circular. The most benign circle possible.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences!
                        Full Idea: Utilitarians say actions must be judged by consequences, because it is impossible to know the origins. But one only knows the consequences about five steps ahead, and who knows what an action can stimulate, excite, provoke?
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §291)
                        A reaction: The utilitarian slogan seems to be 'do your best', but that could apply equally to intentions and consequences. Nietzsche seems to offer nothing to compensate us for our massive ignorance. Nihilism.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail
                        Full Idea: It is a sign of degeneration when eudaemonistic valuations begin to prevail (physiological fatigue, feebleness of the will).
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §222)
                        A reaction: Aristotle's analysis of eudaimonia says that it is only achievable through action, and he considers consequences to be an essential part of an action. Surely hedonism is more degenerate than aiming at all-round success in life?
We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms
                        Full Idea: One has no right to 'happiness': the individual human being is in precisely the same case as the lowest worm.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §759)
                        A reaction: This seems an obvious truth, but nicely made clear. It is, I suppose, aimed at Christians and socialists.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both
                        Full Idea: Brave and creative men never consider pleasure and pain as ultimate values - they are epiphenomena: one must desire both if one is to achieve anything.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §579)
                        A reaction: I am struggling with the notion that I must desire pain if I am ambitious, but to label these feeling 'epiphenomena' is challenging and plausible. I certainly deny that they have intrinsic value, which is a matter of judgement, not feeling.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak
                        Full Idea: There cannot be anything other than egoism; in men whose ego is weak and thin the power of great love also grows weak.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §362)
                        A reaction: We have captured this now in the popular psychological notion of 'low self-esteem', which blights a persons behaviour. It runs counter to the Christian ideal of self-effacing altruism.
The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal
                        Full Idea: Egoism! But no one has yet asked: what kind of ego? On the contrary, everyone unconsciously thinks every ego equal to every other ego.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §364)
                        A reaction: The implication, I presume, is that you should be egoistic if you have a really excellent ego, but very altruistic if you are a loser. Or a slave. Or a monk.
The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all
                        Full Idea: The 'subject' is only a fiction: the ego of which one speaks when one censures egoism does not exist at all.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §370)
                        A reaction: This is the true Nietzsche, the nihilistic relativist. On optimistic days he thought some people had quivering dynamic egoes, to which they apparently owe duties, as one might to a great talent with which one was born.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited
                        Full Idea: The rule 'do nothing that ought not to be done to you' prohibits actions on account of their harmful consequences: the concealed premise is that an action will always be requited.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §925)
                        A reaction: Indeed it seems to be a slogan for contractarians, though I don't see why you shouldn't be influenced by the thought that there might be reciprocation, even if you don't expect it.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will
                        Full Idea: The tremendous rat's tail of errors that has hitherto counted as the highest inspiration of humanity: 'All happiness is a consequence of virtue, all virtue is a consequence of free will!'
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §705)
                        A reaction: A nice suggestion about the hidden agenda of Greek and Christian philosophy. If one began to doubt free will, where would that leave Socrates and Aristotle?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"?
                        Full Idea: Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"?
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §066)
                        A reaction: Quite so, though Nietzsche isn't the person to offer a solution. Choose the route of Aristotle ('normal' human function), or Kant (escape from nature into reason).
Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity
                        Full Idea: Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §120)
                        A reaction: I like that. The notion of dividing humanity into natural and unnatural makes me uneasy (and certainly isn't PC), and yet us all having to be 'natural' seems a conservative straight-jacket.
'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy'
                        Full Idea: One drives nature out of morality when one say "love your enemies": for then the natural "Though shalt love thy neighbour and hate thy enemy" in the law (in instinct) has become meaningless.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §204)
                        A reaction: When the stoics said 'live according to nature' they meant according to reason, which presumably compromises with enemies. Profoundly Christian acts may be unnatural, but they are very moving.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent
                        Full Idea: It would arouse doubts in us concerning a man if we heard he needed reasons for remaining decent: certainly, we would avoid him.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §313)
                        A reaction: This is a perfect slogan for virtue theory, and so rather surprising coming from Nietzsche. And 'decent' isn't a great Nietzsche value (though he WAS a very decent man).
Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities
                        Full Idea: Above all, gentlemen of virtue, you are not our superiors: it is a miserable self-interest and prudence that suggests virtue to you. If you had more strength and courage you would not reduce yourselves to virtuous nonentities in this way.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §318)
                        A reaction: It is certainly true that virtue is about self-interest, and also that it tends to be rather conservative. But we recognise the virtues of adventure and risk.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle
                        Full Idea: The instinct of the herd considers the middle and the mean as the highest and most valuable: the place where the majority finds itself.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §280)
                        A reaction: The reason, I think, for Nietzsche's hostility to Aristotle. But the doctrine of the mean doesn't just seek the middle. It seeks what is appropriate. The mean for bravery and cowardice is not somewhat timid bravery; it is alarmingly brave, but sensible.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being
                        Full Idea: Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance are just so many hindrances to a sovereign disposition, great inventiveness, heroic purposiveness, noble being-for-oneself.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §358)
                        A reaction: The traditional virtues here are reasonably precise and clear, but Nietzsche's preferred virtues are vague, and open to bizarre interpretations. One foresees a bunch of obsessive arrogant fools trying to live up to Nietzsche's ideal.
Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave
                        Full Idea: Modest, industrious, benevolent, temperate: is that how you would have men? good men? But to me that seems only the ideal slave, the slave of the future.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §356)
                        A reaction: An extremely good critical observation on virtue theory. Start from scratch, and list the virtues you would want in a good slave.
A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one
                        Full Idea: A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §310)
                        A reaction: A nicely wicked Nietzschean suggestion. One doesn't replace altruism, one 'reinterprets' it. Or democracy. Or 'true' courage.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice')
                        Full Idea: One desires freedom as long as one does not possess power. Once one does possess it, one desires to overpower; if one cannot do that (if one is too weak), one desires 'justice', i.e. equal power.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §784)
                        A reaction: Personally I hope the Martians have freedom and justice, but that is presumably just a sublimation. People have given up power for freedom and justice.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour
                        Full Idea: The type of the ambitious man who thirsts after honour is supposed to be Napoleon, or Caesar, or Alexander! As if these were not precisely the great despisers of honour!
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §751)
                        A reaction: I'm not sure how Nietzsche knows this, but it sounds right. Great success comes from total focus on the end, not on incidental rewards.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason
                        Full Idea: One needed God as an unconditional sanction, as a 'categorical imperative'; or, if one believed in the authority of reason, one needed a metaphysic of unity, by virtue of which this was logical.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §275)
                        A reaction: I am not sure what a 'metaphysic of unity' is, but this still captures the problem with Kant. The categorical imperative is purely formal, and will justify consistent principles of pain and destruction, without some value to get it off the ground.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians
                        Full Idea: Utilitarianism (socialism, democracy) criticises the origins of moral evaluations, but it believes them just as much as the Christian does.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §253)
                        A reaction: It is a critique of both utilitarianism and Kantian deontology that they seem to rest on unquestioned assumptions about what has value (pleasure, happiness, reason). I think Aristotle offers a better answer to this problem than 'divine' authority.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals
                        Full Idea: Having unlearned faith, one still seeks another authority (in conscience, or reason, or social instinct, or history); one wants to get around the will, the willing of a goal, the risk of positing a goal for oneself.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §020)
                        A reaction: But what goal should you risk willing, and why? And what limits my goals? What is the hallmark of a healthy goal, or good taste in goals, or whatever it is Nietzsche aspires to?
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern
                        Full Idea: A virtuous man is a lower species because he is not a "person" but acquires his value by conforming to a pattern of man that is fixed once and for all.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §319)
                        A reaction: A penetrating critque of virtue theory. If, even now, we are trying to conform to Aristotle's model, that is VERY conservative. The obliteration of individual identity is also a charge against Kant and Bentham. Virtues are more flexible than rules.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals
                        Full Idea: Formerly one employed morality for preservation: but nobody wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to preserve. Therefore an experimental morality: to give oneself a goal.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §260)
                        A reaction: This strikes me as the essence of Nietzsche, and the relativist position. Exciting and dangerous. Let's kill someone (Gide). Take drugs (Manson). Betray friends (Genet). Be altruistic…?
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide
                        Full Idea: The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §121)
                        A reaction: Intriguing. What can Nietzsche have meant by 'civilization'? Certainly not the English utilitarian ideal. He probably means aristocrats running slaves…
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes
                        Full Idea: Our entire sociology simply does not know any other instinct than that of the herd, i.e. that of the sum of zeroes - where every zero has "equal rights", where it is virtuous to be zero.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §053)
                        A reaction: I see his point, but all social arrangements are a trade-off. It would be quite exciting if warlike aristocrats dragged us into massive conquest, but nuclear weapons seem to have ruined that game.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation
                        Full Idea: Science has emptied the concept of causality of its content and retained it as a formula of an equation, in which it has become at bottom a matter of indifference on which side cause is placed and on which side effect.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §551)
                        A reaction: What a perceptive remark in the nineteenth century. Science is notoriously uninterested in the direction of time, and such a symmetry seems to make the concept of causation redundant.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things
                        Full Idea: The popular belief in cause and effect is founded on the presupposition that free will is the cause of every effect: it is only from this that we derive the feeling of causality.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §667)
                        A reaction: It may be that our first experiences of causation involve the wil, though I don't see why babies shouldn't also observe. Nietzsche is muddling the epistemology with the ontology.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal
                        Full Idea: When a 'species' appears, it is a phase in which evolution is not visible, so an equilibrium seems to have been attained, making possible the false notion that a goal has been attained, and that evolution has a goal.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §521)
                        A reaction: A penetrating explanation of a crucial that won't go away, and that still grips people's minds. Even if we all want a particular goal, evolution will ignore our dreams and go another way.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life
                        Full Idea: The concept 'God' represents a turning away from life, a critique of life, even a contempt for it.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §141)
                        A reaction: Clearly Nietzsche has the same view of Platonism, and any view which aspires to 'higher' things, and views humans as being potentially divine (even Aristotle's dream of pure 'contemplation').
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality
                        Full Idea: Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §018)
                        A reaction: A nice remark. The interesting implication is that theists do NOT cling so strongly to morality (perhaps because they hope for mercy, or ultimate justice).
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing
                        Full Idea: Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing! The "beyond" is absolutely necessary if faith in morality is to be maintained.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §253)
                        A reaction: It strikes me that Nietzsche is self-evidently wrong. We must ask why people hang on to moral absolutes after they lose religious faith. Nietzsche seems to think it is a comfort blanket. But he admits the contractarian origins of morality.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class
                        Full Idea: Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state: it forbids oaths, war service, courts of justice, defence of self or community, the distinction between citizens and foreigners, and differences of class.
                        From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §207)
                        A reaction: Interesting. This tension is still in Christianity, and permeates international socialism movements. But then Diogenes the Cynic said he was a citizen of the world.