Ideas from 'Morality and Art' by Philippa Foot [1972], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Moral Dilemmas' by Foot,Philippa [OUP 2002,0-19-925284-x]].
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
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22445
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Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder
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Full Idea:
While one can determine from the concept of morality that there is an objection to murder one cannot determine completely what will count as murder.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.7)
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A reaction:
She then refers to abortion, but there are military and criminal problem cases, and killings by neglect or side effect.
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
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22444
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A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life
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Full Idea:
A moral system seems necessarily to be one aimed at removing particular dangers and securing certain benefits.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.6)
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A reaction:
I thoroughly approve of this approach to morality, which anchors it in real life, rather than in ideals or principles of reason.
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
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22447
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Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity
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Full Idea:
When we say that something 'just is' right or wrong we want to give the impression of some kind of fact or authority standing behind our words, ...maintaining the trappings of objectivity though the substance is not there.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.9)
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A reaction:
Foot favours the idea that such a claim must depend on reasons, and that the reasons arise out of actual living. She's right.
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
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We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone
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Full Idea:
It would be more honest to recognise that the 'should' of moral judgement is sometimes merely an instrument by which we (for our own very good reasons) try to impose a rule of conduct even on the uncaring man?
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From:
Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.18)
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A reaction:
This is a good example, I think, of the ordinary language tradition that Foot grew up in. We load a word like 'should' with a mystical power, but the situations in which it is actually used bring us back down to earth.
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25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
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In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice
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Full Idea:
In the problem of abortion there is a genuine choice as to whether or not to count as a human being, with the rights of a human being, what would become a human being but is not yet capable of independent life.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.7)
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A reaction:
There must be some basis for the choice. We can't call a dead person a human being. Choosing to call a tiny zygote a human being seems very implausible. Pre-viability strikes me as implausible.
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