Ideas from 'Morality, Action, and Outcome' by Philippa Foot [1985], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Moral Dilemmas' by Foot,Philippa [OUP 2002,0-19-925284-x]].

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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen
                        Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen.
                        From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
                        A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests.
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences
                        Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do.
                        From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
                        A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad.
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it
                        Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed.
                        From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89)
                        A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday?
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity
                        Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him.
                        From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104)
                        A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them
                        Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing?
                        From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
                        A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment
                        Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment.
                        From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
                        A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group.