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| 22474 | Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility |
| Full Idea: Moral, as opposed to aesthetic, evaluation does require some distinction between actions for which we are responsible and those for which we are not responsible. | |||
| From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.154) | |||
| A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this, but difficult to give a precise account of responsibility, probably because it is not an all-or-nothing matter. If we accept responsibility for our controlled actions, why not for our considered aesthetic judgements? |
| 22472 | The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality |
| Full Idea: I wonder whether the practice of justice may not absolutely require a certain recognition of equality between human beings, not a pretence of the equality of talents, but something deeper. | |||
| From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.152) | |||
| A reaction: {My 'something deeper' is expressed by Foot in a quotation from Gertrude Stein]. This may well be the most fundamental division which runs across a society - between those who accept and those reject human equality. |