Ideas from 'Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?' by Philippa Foot [1995], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Moral Dilemmas' by Foot,Philippa [OUP 2002,0-19-925284-x]].

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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker
                        Full Idea: What all these [non-cognitivist] theories try to do is to give the conditions of use of sentences such as 'It is morally objectionable to break promises', in terms of something which must be true about the speaker.
                        From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
                        A reaction: A wonderfully simple and accurate analysis of this view. Compare analysing 'there is a bus coming towards you' in the same way. Sounds silly, but lots of modern philosophers see things that way.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings
                        Full Idea: The mistake is to think that whatever 'grounds' for a moral judgement may have been given, someone may be unready, indeed unable, to make the moral judgement, because he has not got the attitude or feeling.
                        From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
                        A reaction: This is roughly the Frege-Geach problem for expressivism, of how we still make moral judgements about situations where we ourselves are entirely disinterested (such as ancient historical events).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts
                        Full Idea: The grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in facts about human life.
                        From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.207)
                        A reaction: The best slogan I can find for summarising Foot's metaethics. The facts she refers to the basic human needs. She is right, and this almost bridges the fact-value divide (as long as you give a damn about human needs).