Ideas from 'Moral Arguments' by Philippa Foot [1958], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Virtues and Vices' by Foot,Philippa [Blackwell 1981,0-631-12749-6]].

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22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value
To reject the fact-value distinction, no evidence can count in favour of rightness or wrongness
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad'