Ideas from 'Moral Beliefs' by Philippa Foot [1959], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Virtues and Vices' by Foot,Philippa [Blackwell 1981,0-631-12749-6]].

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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism

23683

Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods

			Full Idea: In her early work she defends the objectivity of moral norms, demonstrating their essential connection to facts about what is good for human beings.
			From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
			A reaction: I don't think she ever gave up this idea, which strikes me as thoroughly Aristotelian. The issue is how to understand what is good for us.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics

23684

Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires

			Full Idea: In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
			From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
			A reaction: Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.

23690

We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire

			Full Idea: Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
			From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
			A reaction: The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good

22379

The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach

			Full Idea: There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
			From: Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
			A reaction: I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.