Ideas from 'Causation' by Tim Crane [1995], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophy: a Guide Through the Subject' (ed/tr Grayling,A.C.) [OUP 1995,0-19-875157-5]].

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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences
                        Full Idea: Events are picked out using descriptions ('The death of Caesar'), while facts are picked out using whole sentences ('Caesar died').
                        From: Tim Crane (Causation [1995], 1.4.2)
                        A reaction: Useful, and interesting. He mentions that Kim's usage doesn't agree with this. For analysis purposes, this means that an event is a more minimal item than a fact, and many facts will contain events as components.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties
                        Full Idea: Some philosophers say that a cause has its effects in virtue of its properties.
                        From: Tim Crane (Causation [1995], 1.4.2)
                        A reaction: The trouble with this approach, I think, is that it encourages us to invent dubious properties, because every explanation of an effect will require one. Dormative properties, for example, are ascribed to sleeping pills.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved
                        Full Idea: An unsatisfactory aspect of the regularity thesis is that it explains why this A caused this B in terms of facts about things other that this A and this B. But we want to know what it is about this A and this B that makes one the cause of the other?
                        From: Tim Crane (Causation [1995], 1.3)
                        A reaction: Well said. This is the failing of any attempt to define things by their relationships (e.g. functional definitions). Hume, of course, was only relying on regularity because when he focused on the actual A and B, they had no helpful experiences to offer.