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1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation |
Full Idea: Thinking, then, is something other than perceiving, and its two kinds are held to be imagination and supposition. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 427b32) |
1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity |
Full Idea: Number we perceive by the denial of continuity. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 425a20) | |||
A reaction: This is a key thought. A being which (call it 'Parmenides') which saying all Being as One, would make no distinctions of identity, and so could not count anything. Why would they want numbers? |
16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter |
Full Idea: If the eye were an animal, sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed it is no longer an eye,except in name. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412b19) | |||
A reaction: This is a drastic view of form as merely function, which occasionally appears in Aristotle. To say a blind eye is not an eye is a tricky move in metaphysics. So what is it? In some sense it is still an eye. |
5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written |
Full Idea: The intellect is in a way potentially the object of thought, but nothing in actuality before it thinks, and the potentiality is like that of the tablet on which there is nothing actually written. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 430a01) | |||
A reaction: This passage is referred to by Leibniz, and is the origin of the concept of the 'tabula rasa'. Aristotle need not be denying innate ideas, but merely describing the phenomenology of the moment before a train of thought begins. |
1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? |
Full Idea: Why is there not also a sense of the senses themselves? And why don't the senses produce sensation without external bodies, since they contain elements? | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 417a04) |
1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? |
Full Idea: A possible line of inquiry would be into the question for what purpose we have many senses and not just one. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 425b07) |
16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong |
Full Idea: Perception of the special objects of sense is never in error or admits the least possible amount of falsehood. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428b18) | |||
A reaction: This is, surprisingly, the view which was raised and largely rejected in 'Theaetetus'. It became a doctrine of Epicureanism, and seems to make Aristotle a thoroughgoing empiricist, though that is not so clear elsewhere. I think Aristotle is right. |
17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived |
Full Idea: Aristotle famously holds that in perception our minds take on the form of what is being perceived. | |||
From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by Edwin D. Mares - A Priori 08.2 | |||
A reaction: [References in Aristotle needed here...] |
1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite |
Full Idea: Where there is perception there is also pleasure and pain, and where there are these, of necessity also appetite. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 413b27) |
1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing |
Full Idea: Flesh is not the ultimate sense-organ. To suppose that it is requires the supposition that on contact with the object the sense-organ itself discerns what is doing the discerning. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 426b18) |
1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses |
Full Idea: Common sense-objects are movement, rest, number, shape and size, which are not special to any one sense, but common to all. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 418a24) |
1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible |
Full Idea: Now I call that sense-object 'special' that does not admit of being perceived by another sense and about which it is impossible to be deceived. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 418a15) |
1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided |
Full Idea: In the thinking soul, images play the part of percepts, and the assertion or negation of good or bad is invariably accompanied by avoidance or pursuit, which is the reason for the soul's never thinking without an image. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a18) |
1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind |
Full Idea: Perception is of particular things, but knowledge is of universals, which are in a way in the soul itself. Thus a man may think whenever he wishes, but not perceive. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 417b28) |
16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties |
Full Idea: In demonstration a definition of the essence is required as starting point, so that definitions which do not enable us to discover the derived properties, or which fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously be dialectical and futile. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 402b25) | |||
A reaction: Interesting to see 'dialectical' used as a term of abuse! Illuminating. For scientific essentialism, then, demonstration is filling out the whole story once the essence has been inferred. It is circular, because essence is inferred from accidents. |
16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line |
Full Idea: In mathematics it is useful for the understanding of the property of the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles to know the essential nature of the straight and the curved or of the line and the plane. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 402b18) | |||
A reaction: Although Aristotle was cautious about this, he clearly endorses here the idea that essences play an explanatory role in geometry. The caution is in the word 'useful', rather than 'vital'. How else can we arrive at this result, though? |
1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality |
Full Idea: The soul seems to be universally defined by three features, so to speak, the production of movement, perception and incorporeality. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 405b14) | |||
A reaction: 'Incorporeality' begs the question, but its appearance is a phenomenon that needs explaining. 'Movement' is an interesting Greek view. Nowadays we would presumably added intentional states, and the contents and meaning of thoughts. No 'reason'? |
5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical |
Full Idea: On the later views inspired by Aristotle's 'De Anima' there was no longer just one soul, but several, and each of them had a great deal in common with the body. | |||
From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.17 | |||
A reaction: Is this based on the faculties of sophia, episteme, nous, techne and phronesis, or is it based on the vegetative, appetitive and rational parts? The latter, I presume. Not so interesting, not so modular. |
12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life |
Full Idea: Soul is substance as the form of a natural body which potentially has life, and since this substance is actuality, soul will be the actuality of such a body. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412a20) | |||
A reaction: To understand what Aristotle means by 'form' you must, I'm afraid, read the 'Metaphysics'. Form isn't shape, but rather the essence which bestows the individual identity on the thing. 'Psuche is the essence of man' might be a better slogan. |
16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end |
Full Idea: The soul is the cause [aitia] of its body alike in three senses which we explicitly recognise. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, and it is (c) the essence of the whole living body. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 415b09) | |||
A reaction: 'Aitia' also means explanation, so these are three ways to explain a human being, by what it does, why what it is for, and by what it intrinsically is. Activity, purpose and nature. |
1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity |
Full Idea: If the soul is composed of parts of the body, or the harmony of the elements composing the body, there will be many souls, and everywhere in the body. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408a15) | |||
A reaction: We will ignore "everywhere in the body", but the rest seems to me exactly right. The idea of the unity of the soul is an understandable and convenient assumption, but it leads to all sorts of confusion. A crowd remains unified if half its members leave. |
1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd |
Full Idea: If soul has parts, what holds them together? Not body, because that is united by soul. If a thing unifies the soul, then THAT is the soul (unless it too has parts, which would lead to an infinite regress). Best to say the soul is a unity. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411b10) | |||
A reaction: You don't need a 'thing' to unify something (like a crowd). I say the body holds the soul together, not physically, but because the body's value permeates thought. The body is the focused interest of the soul, like parents kept together by their child. |
1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts |
Full Idea: The soul is in a way all the things that exist, for all the things that exist are objects either of perception or of thought. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431b22) | |||
A reaction: Sounds very like Berkeley's empirical version of idealism. It also seems to imply modern externalist (anti-individualist) understandings of the mind (which strike me as false). |
1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them |
Full Idea: Most affections (like anger) seem to involve the body, but thinking seems distinctive of the soul. But if this requires imagination, it too involves the body. Only pure mental activity would prove the separation of the two. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 403a08-) | |||
A reaction: What an observant man! Modern neuroscience is bringing out the fact that emotion is central to all mental life. We can't recognise faces without it. I say imagination is essential to pure reason, and that seems emotional too. Reason is physical. |
1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul |
Full Idea: Early thinkers try only to describe the soul, but they fail to go into any kind of detail about the body which is to receive the soul, as if it were possible (as it is in the Pythagorean tales) for just any old soul to be clothed in just any old body. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407b20) | |||
A reaction: Precisely. Anyone who seriously believes that a human mind can be reincarnated in a flea needs their mind examined. Actually they need their brain examined, but that probably wouldn't impress them. I can, of course, imagine moving into a flea. |
2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body |
Full Idea: In 'De Anima' Aristotle cannot fit his account of separable reason - which is not the form of a body - into his general theory that the soul is the form of the body. | |||
From: comment on Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by J.L. Ackrill - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.33 | |||
A reaction: A penetrating observation. Possibly the biggest challenge for a modern physicalist is to give a reductive account of 'pure' reason, in terms of brain events or brain functions. |
1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? |
Full Idea: Perhaps it would be better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does in virtue of the soul. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408b12) | |||
A reaction: This can be seen as incipient behaviourism in Aristotle's view. It echoes the functionalist view that what matters is not what the mind is, or is made of, but what it does. |
13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax |
Full Idea: We should not enquire whether the soul and the body are one thing, any more than whether the wax and its imprint are, or in general whether the matter of each thing is one with that of which it is the matter. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412b05) | |||
A reaction: This is his hylomorphist view of objects, so that the soul is the 'form' which bestows identity (and power) on the matter of which it is made. This remark is thoroughly physicalist. |
23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate |
Full Idea: Aristotle insists [against Plato] that desires, even rational desires, are a capacity distinct from reason, as is perception. Belief is included within reason. And he sometimes distinguishes steps of reasoning from insight. | |||
From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428-432) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Shifting' | |||
A reaction: So the standard picture of desire as permanently in conflict with reason comes from Aristotle. Maybe Plato is right on that one (though he doesn't say much about it). Since objectivity needs knowledge, reason does need belief. |
4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad |
Full Idea: To experience pleasure or pain is to be active with the perceptive mean in relation to good or bad as such. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a10) | |||
A reaction: A bizarre view which is interesting, but strikes me as wrong. We are drawn towards pleasure, but judgement can pull us away again, and 'good' is in the judgement, not in the feeling. |
1740 | Nature does nothing in vain |
Full Idea: Nature does nothing in vain. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 434a29) |
1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement |
Full Idea: There seem to be two producers of movement, either desire or practical intellect, but practical reason begins in desire. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a12-) |
1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts |
Full Idea: Every movement being either a push or a pull, there must be a still point as with the circle, and this will be the point of departure for the movement. | |||
From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433b24) |