Ideas from 'Db (ideas)' by PG [2031], by Theme Structure

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification
                        Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British').
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
                        A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general
                        Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made.
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
                        A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged
                        Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
                        A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
What is true of a set is also true of its members
                        Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members.
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
                        A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument
                        Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said".
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
                        A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality'
                        Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language.
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
                        A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals?
                        Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you?
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
                        A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect!
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense
                        Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on.
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw
                        Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's
                        Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept.
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
                        A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant.
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally
                        Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical.
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
                        A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people
                        Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong.
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG)
                        Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth.
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
                        A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge
                        Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God)
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will?
                        Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will?
                        From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])