Ideas from 'Monadology' by Gottfried Leibniz [1716], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays' by Leibniz,Gottfried (ed/tr Schrecker,P) [Bobbs-Merrill 1965,65-26531 (Cong)]].

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it)
                        Full Idea: The principle of sufficient reason says no fact can be real or existing and no proposition can be true unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise, even though in most cases these reasons cannot be known to us.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §32)
                        A reaction: I think of this as my earliest philosophical perception, a childish rebellion against being told that there was 'no reason' for something. My intuition tells me that it is correct, and the foundation of ontology and truth. Don't ask me to justify it!
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything
                        Full Idea: Every body is sensitive to everything in the universe, so that one who saw everything could read in each body what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened and will happen.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §61)
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood
                        Full Idea: We judge to be false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §31)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul
                        Full Idea: The Leibnizians with their monads have constructed an incomprehensible hypothesis. They have spiritualized matter rather than materialising the soul.
                        From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Julien Offray de La Mettrie - Machine Man p.3
                        A reaction: I agree with La Mettrie. This disagreement shows, I think, how important the problem of interaction between mind and body was in the century after Descartes. Drastic action seemed needed to bridge the gap, one way or the other.
He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads
                        Full Idea: In the end Leibniz dethroned Aristotelian continuants, seen as imperfect from his point of view, in favour of monads.
                        From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 3.1
                        A reaction: I take the 'continuants' to be either the 'ultimate subject of predication' (in 'Categories'), or 'essences' (in 'Metaphysics'). Since monads seem to be mental (presumably to explain the powers of things), this strikes me as a bit mad.
Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads?
                        Full Idea: Can you really maintain that a drop of urine is an infinity of monads, and that each one of these has ideas, however obscure, of the entire universe?
                        From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Francois-Marie Voltaire - works Vol 22:434
                        A reaction: Monads are a bit like Christian theology - if you meet them cold they seem totally ridiculous, but if you meet them after ten years of careful preliminary study they make (apparently) complete sense. Defenders of panpsychism presumably like them.
It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads.
                        Full Idea: It is never clear in the 'Monadologie' how exactly the world of extended bodies is related to the world of simple substances, the world of non-extended and mind-like monads.
                        From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9
                        A reaction: Leibniz was always going to hit the interaction problem, as soon as he started giving an increasingly spiritual account of what a substance, and hence marginalising the 'force' which had held centre-stage earlier on. Presumably they are 'parallel'.
Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance
                        Full Idea: A monad's natural changes come from an internal principle, ...but there must be diversity in that which changes, which produces the specification and variety of substances.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §11-12)
                        A reaction: You don't have to like monads to like this generalisation (and Perkins says Leibniz had a genius for generalisations). Metaphysics must give an account of change. Succeeding time-slices etc explain nothing. Principle and substance must meet.
A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory
                        Full Idea: The general name 'monad' or 'entelechy' may suffice for those substances which have nothing but perception and appetition; the name 'souls' may be reserved for those having perception that is more distinct and accompanied by memory.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §19)
                        A reaction: It is basic to the study of Leibniz that you don't think monads are full-blown consciousnesses. He isn't really a panpsychist, because the level of mental activity is so minimal. There seem to be degrees of monadhood.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity
                        Full Idea: For Leibniz, to distinguish between a substance and its properties in order to provide a thing or entity in which properties can inhere leads necessarily to the absurd conclusion that the substance itself must be a truly characterless non-entity.
                        From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.3
                        A reaction: This is obviously one of the basic thoughts in any discussion of substances. It is why physicists ignore them, and Leibniz opted for a 'bundle' theory. But the alternative seems daft too - free-floating properties, hooked onto one another.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature
                        Full Idea: There are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not possible to discover an internal difference, that is, one founded on an intrinsic denomination.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §09)
                        A reaction: From this it follows that if two things really are indiscernible, then we must say that they are one thing. He says monads all differ from one another. People certainly do. Leibniz must say this of electrons. How can he know this?
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible
                        Full Idea: There are two kinds of truths: of reasoning and of facts. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposites impossible. Facts are contingent and their opposites possible. A necessary truth is known by analysis.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §33)
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated
                        Full Idea: At the end of the analytical method in mathematics there are simple ideas of which no definition can be given. Moreover there are axioms and postulates, in short, primitive principles, which cannot be demonstrated and do not need demonstration.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §35)
                        A reaction: My view is that we do not know such principles when we apprehend them in isolation. I would call them 'intuitions'. They only ascend to the status of knowledge when the mathematics is extended and derived from them, and found to work.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason
                        Full Idea: When we expect it to be day tomorrow, we all behave as empiricists, because until now it has always happened thus. The astronomer alone knows this by reason.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §28)
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it
                        Full Idea: If a conscious machine were increased in size, one might enter it like a mill, but we should only see the parts impinging on one another; we should not see anything which would explain a perception.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §17)
                        A reaction: A wonderful image for capturing a widely held intuition. It seems to motivate Colin McGinn's 'Mysterianism'. The trouble is Leibniz didn't think big/small enough. Down at the level of molecules it might become obvious what a perception is. 'Might'.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths
                        Full Idea: It is through the knowledge of necessary truths and through their abstraction that we rise to reflective acts, which enable us to think of that which is called "I" and enable us to consider that this or that is in us.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §30)
                        A reaction: For Leibniz, necessary truth can only be known a priori. Sense experience won't reveal the self, as Hume observed. We evidently 'abstract' the idea of 'I' from the nature of a priori thought. Animals have no self (or morals) for this reason.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The true elements are atomic monads
                        Full Idea: Monads are the true atoms of nature and, in brief, the elements of things.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], (opening)), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
                        A reaction: Thus in one sentence Leibniz gives us a theory of natural elements, and an account of atoms. This kind of speculation got metaphysics a bad name when science unravelled a more accurate picture. The bones must be picked out of Leibniz.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order
                        Full Idea: From all the possible universes God chooses this one to obtain as much variety as possible, but with the greatest order possible; that is, it is the means of obtaining the greatest perfection possible.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §58)
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible
                        Full Idea: God alone (or the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible.
                        From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §45)