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| 78 | Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious |
| 5248 | Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes |
| 2682 | Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel] |
| 103 | Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps |
| 112 | Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument |
| 22 | Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible |
| 76 | The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary |
| 4333 | Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another |
| 21356 | Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends |
| 35 | A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it |
| 28 | How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? |
| 27 | Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness |
| 5130 | It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' |
| 4391 | Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth |
| 2573 | To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence |
| 5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation |
| 22141 | It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed |
| 95 | If everyone believes it, it is true |
| 79 | Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved |
| 5146 | Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence |
| 5147 | In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous |
| 5148 | The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people |
| 5232 | If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason |
| 5145 | The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way |
| 5266 | It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self |
| 8007 | Aristotle never discusses free will [MacIntyre] |
| 12961 | For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Leibniz] |
| 4118 | A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children |
| 20192 | Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Zagzebski] |
| 4405 | The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul |
| 5160 | There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others |
| 4326 | Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse] |
| 72 | Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things |
| 4380 | Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat] |
| 23320 | Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Frede,M] |
| 5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent |
| 5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self |
| 4383 | Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat] |
| 68 | The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire |
| 4318 | Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Cottingham] |
| 4372 | Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg] |
| 5254 | Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge |
| 5255 | A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular |
| 23317 | Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Frede,M] |
| 23318 | Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Frede,M] |
| 5257 | Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance |
| 73 | Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite |
| 4371 | Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg] |
| 69 | We deliberate about means, not ends |
| 5247 | Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct |
| 80 | Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them |
| 82 | The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues |
| 20212 | Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings |
| 5249 | One cannot be prudent without being good |
| 67 | Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do |
| 5218 | Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices |
| 81 | For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason |
| 5267 | Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing |
| 5213 | If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily |
| 4384 | For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin] |
| 5212 | A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death |
| 52 | We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure |
| 45 | We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good |
| 46 | We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle |
| 5153 | There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation |
| 5134 | Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function |
| 31 | If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one |
| 5231 | To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency |
| 5234 | For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead |
| 5075 | Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R] |
| 21 | Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature |
| 4370 | For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg] |
| 18227 | We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else |
| 4381 | How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill] |
| 33 | Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it |
| 5154 | Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health |
| 5268 | Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception |
| 5229 | The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life |
| 90 | All altruism is an extension of self-love |
| 5262 | Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful |
| 5263 | Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour |
| 2689 | Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies |
| 101 | Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom |
| 5142 | Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds |
| 92 | Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others |
| 5243 | The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves |
| 3559 | For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Annas] |
| 5128 | Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them |
| 5129 | There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences |
| 20 | The good is 'that at which all things aim' |
| 5131 | Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves |
| 5135 | Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first |
| 5269 | Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable |
| 23 | The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure |
| 109 | Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action |
| 26 | Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means |
| 25 | You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain |
| 5136 | Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods |
| 18673 | Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Orsi] |
| 5127 | Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell] |
| 5143 | Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster |
| 2681 | Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel] |
| 5132 | Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself |
| 30 | Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action |
| 39 | Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life |
| 100 | The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness |
| 5139 | If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt |
| 5144 | Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods |
| 106 | The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man |
| 4374 | For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg] |
| 5230 | There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body |
| 5270 | Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones |
| 383 | God feels one simple pleasure forever |
| 98 | It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose |
| 5259 | If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? |
| 96 | Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures |
| 99 | If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort |
| 97 | There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure |
| 5256 | Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity |
| 5258 | While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished |
| 53 | Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality |
| 49 | Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel |
| 84 | The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought |
| 91 | A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best |
| 88 | Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity |
| 71 | Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste |
| 34 | The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue |
| 5137 | Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that |
| 4342 | Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse] |
| 4382 | Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman] |
| 58 | If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions |
| 54 | Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done |
| 4373 | Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg] |
| 63 | Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment |
| 5214 | Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown |
| 5215 | There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action |
| 5216 | An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown |
| 107 | A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness |
| 55 | People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just |
| 5149 | The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral |
| 5156 | How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? |
| 5157 | If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well |
| 4369 | It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Achtenberg] |
| 5158 | Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round |
| 5237 | We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars |
| 3548 | Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas] |
| 4367 | Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone |
| 5223 | We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues |
| 4362 | Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful |
| 56 | A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves |
| 93 | Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness |
| 5225 | The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine |
| 2690 | Associating with good people can be a training in virtue |
| 43 | Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us |
| 44 | We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds |
| 5152 | Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity |
| 51 | True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings |
| 4378 | We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat] |
| 6793 | People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help |
| 57 | We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts |
| 5222 | A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant |
| 4394 | People develop their characters through the activities they pursue |
| 5239 | When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly |
| 4379 | It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument |
| 4386 | Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Urmson] |
| 5250 | The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness |
| 3545 | The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Annas] |
| 60 | The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) |
| 47 | Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean |
| 4406 | Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche] |
| 61 | Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean |
| 4388 | One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson] |
| 4387 | In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson] |
| 62 | We must tune our feelings to be right in every way |
| 5159 | The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong |
| 65 | The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean |
| 5161 | To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult |
| 5235 | Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes |
| 5238 | The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony |
| 5217 | At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning |
| 5236 | It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate |
| 64 | There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong |
| 4117 | Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B] |
| 5251 | Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue |
| 5242 | Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness |
| 5151 | Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people |
| 5261 | Between friends there is no need for justice |
| 5240 | The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation |
| 4389 | What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson] |
| 23556 | Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character |
| 5226 | True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation |
| 5224 | Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death |
| 24 | Honour depends too much on the person who awards it |
| 5233 | Honour is clearly the greatest external good |
| 4119 | If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Williams,B] |
| 18229 | Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain |
| 5272 | The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life |
| 105 | We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us |
| 18232 | The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? |
| 110 | Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate |
| 111 | The more people contemplate, the happier they are |
| 104 | Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man |
| 5138 | The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth |
| 38 | A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless |
| 1665 | It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster |
| 108 | The virtue of generosity requires money |
| 85 | Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends |
| 2686 | Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM] |
| 2687 | For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM] |
| 5252 | 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations |
| 5245 | Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil |
| 5265 | Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being |
| 5133 | Man is by nature a social being |
| 86 | A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible |
| 5140 | Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens |
| 21046 | The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens |
| 5241 | We hold that every piece of legislation is just |
| 87 | Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality |
| 5260 | Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice |
| 5264 | Friendship is based on a community of sharing |
| 21047 | Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Sandel] |
| 21044 | For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Sandel] |
| 5246 | Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance |
| 5150 | Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit |
| 5228 | A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed |
| 2684 | Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin] |
| 5227 | The nature of any given thing is determined by its end |
| 5219 | Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency |
| 24037 | We all assume immortality is impossible |