Ideas from 'Sophistical Refutations' by Aristotle [331 BCE], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Sophistical Refutations, On the Cosmos etc (III)' by Aristotle (ed/tr Forster,E.S. /Furley,D.J.) [Harvard Loeb 1955,0-674-99441-8]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

2676	Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner

			Full Idea: Didactic arguments are those which reason from the principles appropriate to each branch of learning and not from the opinions of the answerer (for he who is learning must take things on trust).
			From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165b01)

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason

2675	Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements

			Full Idea: Reasoning is based on certain statements made in such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of things other than those statements and as a result of those statements.
			From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165a01)

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic

2677	Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction

			Full Idea: Dialectical arguments are those which, starting from generally accepted opinions, reason to establish a contradiction.
			From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165b03)

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic

2674	Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition

			Full Idea: Those who compete and contend in argument aim at five objects: refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and the reduction of one's opponent to a state of babbling, that is, making him say the same thing over and over again.
			From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165b15)

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and

16967

'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't

			Full Idea: If you ask 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home or not at home?', whether they are both at home or not there, the number of propositions is more than one. For if the answer is true, it does not follow that the question is a single one.
			From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 176a08)
			A reaction: [compressed] Aristotle is saying that some questions should not receive a 'yes' or 'no' answer, because they are equivocal. Arthur Prior cites this passage, on 'and'. Ordinary use of 'and' need not be the logical use of 'and'.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species

16149

Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing

			Full Idea: 'Man', and every generic term, denotes not an individual substance but a quality or relation or mode or something of the kind.
			From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 179a01)
			A reaction: This is Aristotle's denial that species constitutes the essence of anything. I take 'man' to be a categorisation of individuals, and is ontologically nothing at all in its own right.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law

11840

Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes

			Full Idea: It is only to things which are indistinguishable and one in essence [ousia] that all the same attributes are generally held to belong.
			From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 179a37)
			A reaction: This simply IS Leibniz's Law (to which I shall from now on quietly refer to as 'Aristotle's Law'). It seems that it just as plausible to translate 'ousia' as 'being' rather than 'essence'. 'Indistinguishable' and 'one in ousia' are not the same.