Ideas from 'Event Causation: counterfactual analysis' by Jonathan Bennett [1987], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Causation' (ed/tr Sosa,E. /Tooley,M.) [OUP 1993,0-19-875094-3]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     unexpand these ideas

---

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events

8440	Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it

			Full Idea: It has been argued that an event's time of occurrence is essential to it.
			From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.221)
			A reaction: [He cites Lawrence Lombard] This sound initially implausible, particularly if a rival event happened, say, .1 of a second later than the actual event. It might depend on one's view about determinism. Interesting.

8439	Maybe each event has only one possible causal history

			Full Idea: Perhaps it is impossible that an event should have had a causal history different from the one that it actually had.
			From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.220)
			A reaction: [He cites van Inwagen for this] The idea is analagous to baptismal accounts of reference. Individuate an event by its history. It might depend (as Davidson implies) on how you describe the event.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

8436	Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual

			Full Idea: We must choose between subsumption and counterfactual analyses of causal statements. The former means that cause and effect have some properties that enables them to be subsumed under a conditional. The latter is just 'if no-c then no-e'.
			From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.217)
			A reaction: I have an immediate preference for the former account, which seems to potentially connect it with physics and features of the world which make one thing lead to another. The counterfactual account seems very thin, and is more like mere semantics.

8441	Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might

			Full Idea: Although you cannot cause a fire by delaying something's burning, you can cause a fire by hastening something's burning.
			From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.223)
			A reaction: A very nice observation which brings out all sorts of problems about identifying causes. Bennett is criticising the counterfactual account. It is part of the problem of pre-emption, where causes are queueing up to produce a given effect.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause

8435	Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped')

			Full Idea: Theories of causation are split between event and fact/state of affairs theories. The first have the form 'the explosion caused the fire' (perfect nominals) and the second have the form 'the fire started because a bomb dropped' (sentential clauses).
			From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987])
			A reaction: Surely events must have priority? The form which uses facts is drifting off into explanation, and is much more likely to involve subjective human elements and interpretations. Events are closer to the physics, and the mechanics of what happens.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation

8437	The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive

			Full Idea: The refinement of a simple counterfactual analysis is to say that cause and effect depend on a series of events. This must be asserted because counterfactual conditionals are well known not to be transitive.
			From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987])
			A reaction: This fills out the theory, but offers another target for critics. If the glue that binds the series is not in the counterfactuals, is it just in the mind of the speaker? How do you decide what's in the series? Cf. deciding offside in football (soccer!).

8438	A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence

			Full Idea: Any counterfactual about a particular event implies or presupposes something about the event's essence.
			From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.219)
			A reaction: This is where the counterfactual theory suddenly becomes more interesting, instead of just being a rather bare account of the logical structure of causation. (Bennett offers some discussion of possible essential implications).