Ideas from 'Philosophical Remarks' by Ludwig Wittgenstein [1930], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Remarks' by Wittgenstein,Ludwig (ed/tr Rhees/Hargreaves/White) [Blackwell 1975,0-631-19130-5]].

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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence
                        Full Idea: What I once called 'objects', simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk of their possible non-existence.
                        From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.72), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 52 'Simp'
                        A reaction: For most of us, you can refer to something because you take it to be an object. For these Fregean influenced guys (e.g. Hale) something is an object because you can refer to it. Why don't they use 'object*' for their things?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Language pictures the essence of the world
                        Full Idea: The essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world.
                        From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.85), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 17
                        A reaction: Hence for a long time the study of language seemed to be the way to do metaphysics. Now they study mathematical logic, with the same hope.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it
                        Full Idea: It isn't possible to believe something for which you cannot imagine some kind of verification.
                        From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.200), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr'
                        A reaction: In 1930 LW was calling this his 'old principle'. As it stands here it is too vague to assert very much.