Ideas from 'A Theory of Conditionals' by Robert C. Stalnaker [1968], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Causation and Conditionals' (ed/tr Sosa,Ernest) [OUP 1980,0-19-875030-7]].

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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false
                        Full Idea: Consider a possible world in which A is true and otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. 'If A, then B' is true (false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible world.
                        From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1
                        A reaction: This is the first proposal to give a possible worlds semantics for conditional statements. Edgington observes that worlds which are nearby for me may not be nearby for you.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs
                        Full Idea: A possible world is the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs.
                        From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1
                        A reaction: Sounds neat and persuasive. What is the ontological analogue of a stock of hopes? Heaven!