Ideas from 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey' by Roger Scruton [1994], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Modern Philosophy: introduction and survey' by Scruton,Roger [Sinclair-Stevenson 1994,1-85619-392-6]].

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation

3879	Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything

			Full Idea: Philosophy studies everything: it tries to provide a theory of the whole of things.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 1.2)
			A reaction: Good, but you can't avoid value-judgements about which things are important; philosophers place more value on moral theories than on theories about glacier movement. There is a tension in philosophy between human and eternal concerns.

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions

3891	If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p

			Full Idea: If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 15.7)

2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question

3894	We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good

			Full Idea: The 'open question' argument is clearly invalid. A question remains open just so long as our ignorance permits. …It may be an open question whether promoting happiness is good, even though this is what 'good' means.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.1)
			A reaction: A nice objection. Like small children, we can keep asking questions forever. Whether there is a question to be asked about a thing is not a property of that thing, but of us who ask it.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth

3883	A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition

			Full Idea: A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition: no truth is contradicted by another.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 9.1)
			A reaction: Interesting. It resembles the rule that if you always tell the truth you don't need to remember what you said. Close to the heart of the concept of truth. Coherence and correspondence.

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth

3884	The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth

			Full Idea: The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 9.4)

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure

3907	Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects?

			Full Idea: Could someone have a perfect intellectual acquaintance with numbers, but be incapable of counting a flock of sheep?
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.6)

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism

3908	If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs

			Full Idea: If there can be unprovable truths of mathematics, then mathematics cannot be reduced to the proofs whereby we construct it.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.7)

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties

3906	If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties

			Full Idea: If the only way of defining properties involves quantifying over possible worlds, this could be taken as another reason for abandoning properties altogether.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.4)

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

3888	Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re

			Full Idea: It was one of the assumptions of Hume's empiricism that all necessities are de dicto: i.e. they are artefacts of language.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 13.5)

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable

3903	The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable

			Full Idea: If there are things which are possible but inconceivable, we must abandon the view, which has had a considerable following since Descartes, that the conceivable is a test of the possible.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 25)

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

3897	Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge

			Full Idea: In my view the concept of knowledge is of no very great interest in epistemology, which actually concerns the justification of belief.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 22)
			A reaction: I think this is an excellent thought. I see knowledge as slippery, and partially contextual, and I don't care whether someone precisely 'knows' something. I just want to know why they believe it.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito

3881	In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness

			Full Idea: In the course of the argument the first person has acquired a character; he is not merely conscious, but self-conscious.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 4)

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic

3887	Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori

			Full Idea: 'Every event has a cause' and 'truth is correspondence to facts' are candidates for being synthetic a priori knowledge.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 13.2)

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities

3901	Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities

			Full Idea: Touch seems to deliver a purely primary-quality account of the world.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 24)
			A reaction: Interesting, though a little over-confident. It seems occasionally possible for touch to be an illusion.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique

3885	We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities

			Full Idea: Bradley argued that we cannot conceive of primary qualities except as attached to secondary qualities.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 10.1)

3910	If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities?

			Full Idea: If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what do secondary qualities inhere in?
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], Ch.10 n)
			A reaction: What is the problem? A pin causes me pain, but I know the pain isn't in the pin. It is the same with colour. It is a mental property, if you like, triggered by a wavelength of radiation.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation

3899	The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states

			Full Idea: The representational theory is the unsurprising view that perceptual states are intentional, like beliefs, emotions and desires.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 23.3)

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification

3898	My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow

			Full Idea: It is impossible that my present belief that it will rain tomorrow is caused by its raining tomorrow.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 22.4)
			A reaction: This doesn't demolish a causal account of belief. It would be very surprising if I were to believe it was going to rain tomorrow for no cause whatsoever. That would be irrational.

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique

3880	Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion

			Full Idea: If the evidence for p is q, and that is the only evidence there is or can be, then 'p' means q. Hence there is no gap between evidence and conclusion, and the sceptical problem does not arise.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 3.2)

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique

3878	Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths?

			Full Idea: A writer who says that there are no truths, or that all truth is 'merely relative', is asking you not to believe him. So don't.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 1.1)

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism

3892	Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same

			Full Idea: To say that every event has a cause is one thing; to say that every event is determined by its cause is quite another thing.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 17.1)

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism

3911	The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence

			Full Idea: It is often held to be a consequence of the rationalist conception of substance, that separate substances cannot interact (since causal interaction is a form of mutual dependence).
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], Ch.16 n)
			A reaction: Yes, substances seem incapable of interaction, just as Leibniz argues that perfections could never interact. They are too pure.

19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language

3882	Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private

			Full Idea: Wittgenstein's point is that if I search for foundations in what can only be known to me, then the belief that I have discovered those foundations will also fall victim to Descartes' demon.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 5.3)
			A reaction: Why should foundations based in wider society or a language community fare any better? Getting a lot of people to agree won't trouble the demon too much. Flat earthers.

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider

3896	Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in

			Full Idea: Any attempt to provide a social justification of morality runs the risk of the 'free rider' - one who pretends to play the game in order to enjoy the fruits of it.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.6)

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty

3886	Membership is the greatest source of obligation

			Full Idea: Membership is the greatest source of obligation.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 11.2)
			A reaction: An interesting and rather Aristotelian idea. The alternative is individual debt or obligation.

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative

3895	The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers

			Full Idea: The categorical imperative is also an instrument of negotiation and compromise between strangers, through which they can rise out of enmity and confront each other as equals.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.6)

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

3890	'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation

			Full Idea: Traditionally (before Leibniz and Spinoza) the world 'cause' signified any valid explanation.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 14)

27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space

3904	Measuring space requires no movement while I do it

			Full Idea: I can measure the length of something only if I know that it has not moved between the moment when I locate one end of it and the moment when I locate the other.
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 25.3)
			A reaction: A nice example of how even simple propositions have many presuppositions.

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique

3905	'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance

			Full Idea: When I say that a man exists, Frege argues, I do not predicate existence of a man, but rather of the concept man: I say the concept has at least one instance (and existence is a predicate of predicates).
			From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.2)