Ideas from 'The View from Nowhere' by Thomas Nagel [1986], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The View from Nowhere' by Nagel,Thomas [OUP 1989,0-19-505644-2]].

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated

3240	There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy

3242	Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent

3241	It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

3248	Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective

20989

Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species

22354

Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Reiss/Sprenger]

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

3249	Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities

22429

We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification

3247	Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique

3252	Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible

14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction

3251	Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self

3244	Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori

3245	The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness

3246	I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value

3257	Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

3265	We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism

3263	If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure

3256	Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology

3261	Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty

3258	If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability

3254	If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory

3264	We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty

3255	We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism

3262	Utilitarianism is too demanding