Ideas from 'Belief Truth and Knowledge' by David M. Armstrong [1973], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Belief Truth and Knowledge' by Armstrong,D.M. [CUP 1981,0-521-09737-1]].

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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception

3900	Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs

			Full Idea: Armstrong has argued that experience, as normally understood, is not necessary to perception. To perceive is to acquire beliefs, through a causal process.
			From: report of David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973]) by Roger Scruton - Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey 23.4

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

4253	Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true

			Full Idea: Externalist accounts of non-inferential knowledge say what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which holds between the belief state and the situation which makes the belief true.
			From: David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973], 11.III.6)
			A reaction: Armstrong's concept is presumably a response to Quine's desire to 'naturalise epistemology'. Bad move, I suspect. It probably reduces knowledge to mere true belief, and hence a redundant concept.