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| 22191 | Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on |
| Full Idea: In Kuhn's view scientists are decidedly not interested in falsifying their paradigm, because without a paradigm there is no systematic inquiry at all. | |||
| From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Geoffrey Gorham - Philosophy of Science 3 | |||
| A reaction: This seems to be one of the stronger aspects of Kuhn's account. You'd be leaving the big house, to go out on the road with a tent. |
| 18076 | Most theories are continually falsified |
| Full Idea: Kuhn contends that almost all theories are falsified at almost all times. | |||
| From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 07.1 | |||
| A reaction: This is obviously meant to demolish Karl Popper. |
| 22183 | Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience |
| Full Idea: The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience which cannot be forced. | |||
| From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]), quoted by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 5 | |||
| A reaction: This is the controversial part of Kuhn, which says that the most important decisions are not really rational. Anyone who thought the interpretation of a bunch of evidence is logical needed their head examined. But it IS rational. |
| 6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions |
| Full Idea: Kuhn and Feyerabend adopt a description theory of reference; the term 'electron' refers to whatever satisfies the descriptions associated with electrons, and since these descriptions vary between theories, so too must the reference. | |||
| From: comment on Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.3 | |||
| A reaction: This is a key idea in modern philosophy, showing why all of reality and science were at stake when Kripke and others introduced a causal theory of reference. All the current debates about externalism and essentialism grow from this problem. |
| 22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of incommensurability stems from Kuhn's belief that scientific concepts derive their meaning from the theory in which they play a role. | |||
| From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 5 | |||
| A reaction: Quine was the source of this. Kripke's direct reference theory was meant to be the answer. |
| 7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them |
| Full Idea: To tell us that Galileo had 'incommensurable' notions and then go on to describe them at length is totally incoherent. | |||
| From: comment on Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.5 | |||
| A reaction: How refreshingly sensible. Incommensurability is the sort of nonsense you slide into if you take an instrumental view of science. But scientists are continually aim to pin down what is actually there. Translation between theories is very difficult! |