Ideas from 'Freedom and Reason' by Richard M. Hare [1963], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Freedom and Reason' by Hare,R.M. [OUP 1978,0-19-881092-x]].

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22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Moral statements are imperatives rather than to avowals of emotion - but universalisable
                        Full Idea: According to Hare's universal prescriptivism, moral statements are closer to imperatives than to avowals of emotion; their purpose is to guide action. But unlike imeperatives they are universalisable.
                        From: report of Richard M. Hare (Freedom and Reason [1963]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.9
                        A reaction: Why isn't 'everyone ought to support West Ham' a moral judgement?
Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism
                        Full Idea: Hare has suggested that a fairly tight form of utilitarianism can be obtained from universalised prescriptivism.
                        From: report of Richard M. Hare (Freedom and Reason [1963]) by Philippa Foot - Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? p.191
                        A reaction: All the benefits of Bentham, Kant and Hume, in one neat package! Since I take all three of them to be wrong about ethics, that counts against this idea.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism
                        Full Idea: Hare has proposed that utilitarianism is the ultimate standard to which we are led by the categorical imperative.
                        From: report of Richard M. Hare (Freedom and Reason [1963], p.123-4) by Thomas Nagel - Equality and Partiality
                        A reaction: It seems to me better to say that Kant starts (unwittingly) from something like utilitarianism, that is, an assumption that human happiness and welfare have some sort of intrinsic value that cannot be demonstrated. Otherwise evil can be universalised.