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Ideas from 'Philosophy of Mind' by John Heil [1998], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophy of Mind' by Heil,John [Routledge 1998,0-415-13060-3]].

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
4588 There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
4616 A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
4603 Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4617 A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
4612 Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate
4615 Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4587 From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4611 The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
4592 If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
4586 You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
4591 Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
4610 Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
4618 If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4621 Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
4623 Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
4626 The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
4622 Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
4590 If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4614 Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4595 No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
4599 Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
4624 If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
4601 Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels
4602 Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
4593 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
4597 Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4609 It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
4596 The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
4598 Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4619 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised
4620 Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
4594 A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
4625 Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
4607 Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
4605 Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning'
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
4606 To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble'
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
4604 If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them?