Ideas from 'Philosophy of Mind' by John Heil [1998], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophy of Mind' by Heil,John [Routledge 1998,0-415-13060-3]].

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences
                        Full Idea: There is no such thing as science; there are only sciences: physics, chemistry, meteorology, geology, biology, psychology, sociology.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Intro)
                        A reaction: A simple but nice point. It suggests that maybe each science has an entirely different method, and style of reasoning, experiment and explanation. Some have strict laws, others have 'ceteris paribus' laws.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws
                        Full Idea: 'Supervenience' means lower-level objects and properties suffice for the higher level ones, but the higher level is distinct from its ground, which is reflected in the higher level being governed by distinct laws of nature.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: A nice summary of Davidson's idea. It feels wrong to me. Can I create some 'new laws of nature' by combining things novelly in a laboratory so that a supervenient state emerges. Sounds silly to me. Must we invoke God to achieve this?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws
                        Full Idea: Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4)
                        A reaction: The problem is that anything which can't figure in a causal law will therefore be undetectable, so we could only speculate about the existence of such properties, never know them.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone
                        Full Idea: A predicate that does not designate a property could nevertheless hold true of an object in virtue of that object's properties. An object is a stone not in virtue of holding the property of being a stone, but because it possesses certain other properties.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: Sounds simple but important, especially in relation to the mind. We are left with the problem of how to individuate a property, and the possibility of 'basic' properties.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties
                        Full Idea: New combinations of properties are just that: new combinations, not new properties. (This is not to reject complex properties, but only to reaffirm that complex properties are nothing over and above their constituents suitably arranged).
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: I wish I could be so confidence, but no one seems quite sure what a property is. Are they defined causally, or as 'qualities'? If the latter, what is a quality? Are there basic properties? Can properties merge to form a new one?
Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate
                        Full Idea: Complex properties do not "emerge"; they are nothing "over and above" the properties of the simple constituents duly arranged.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: I am glad to see someone challenging the concept of 'emergence', which strikes me as incoherent. Small properties add up to macro-properties (like 'steep', or 'square').
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property
                        Full Idea: If P and Q are predicates denoting properties, we can construct a disjunctive predicate ('P or Q'). But it is not clear that this gives us any right whatever to suppose that 'P or Q' designates a property.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Pref)
                        A reaction: An important idea, needed to disentangle our ontology from our language, and realise that they are separate. Properties are natural; predicates are conventional.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties
                        Full Idea: I resist the term 'trope' as it has become common for the proponents of tropes to regard objects as "bundles" of tropes. This turns tropes into something too much resembling parts of objects for my taste. .I think an object is a possessor of properties.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: This seems to imply a belief in 'substance', which is an intrinsically dodgy concept, but something has to exist. Keep ontology and epistemology separate! We can only know bundles of properties.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat
                        Full Idea: If a boat can continue to exist after the planks that currently make it up have ceased to exist, and if the planks could continue to exist when the boat does not, then a boat cannot be identified with the planks that make it up at a given time.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.2)
                        A reaction: This seems obvious, but it opposes Locke's claim that the particles of an object are its identity. Does this mean identities are entirely in our heads, and not a feature of nature? I want to resist that.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology
                        Full Idea: We should be suspicious of anyone who embraces the formal apparatus of possible worlds while rejecting the ontology.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Pref)
                        A reaction: What matters is that good philosophy should not duck the ontological implications of any apparatus. If only embracing the 'ontology of possible worlds' were a simple matter. What makes one world 'close' to another?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality
                        Full Idea: Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.2)
                        A reaction: Nicely put. There is a certain intellectual integrity about idealism, but it is still mad. The overall picture seems to me incoherent if we don't assume that appearances are bringing us close to reality (without ever quite getting there).
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought
                        Full Idea: One generation addresses the qualitative aspect of mentality, the next focuses on its scientific standing, its successor takes up the problem of mental content, then the cycle starts all over again…
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: This pinpoints the three interlinked questions. We seem to be currently obsessed with the quality of experience (the 'Hard Question'), but the biggest questions is how the three aspects fit together. If there are three necessities here, they must coexist.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind
                        Full Idea: If a mental property is realised by a material property, then it looks as though its material realiser pre-empts any causal contribution on the part of the realised mental property.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: This has a beautiful simplicity about it. I can see how some very odd phenomena might suddenly appear out of a physical combination, but not how entirely new causal laws can be created.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities
                        Full Idea: Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: If only I knew what a 'quality' was. Do combinations have qualities in addition to the qualities of the components? A pair of trees, a pile of sand, a mass of neurons.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery
                        Full Idea: Some philosophers have thought that intentional states are exhausted by propositional attitudes, but what about mental imagery? You may have propositional attitudes to food, but I would wager that most of your thoughts about it are imagistic.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: Seems right. If I encounter an object by which I am bewildered, I may form no propositions at all about it, but I can still contemplate the object.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world
                        Full Idea: The prevailing 'externalist' line on intentionality regards intentional states of mind as owing their content (what they are of, or about) to causal relations agents bear to the world.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: This goes back to Putnam's Twin Earth. 'Meanings aren't in the head'. I may defer to experts about what 'elm' means, but I may also be arrogantly wrong about what 'juniper' means.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements
                        Full Idea: Error, like truth, presupposes judgement. Judgements you make about your conscious states are distinct from those states. This leaves room for error.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: This sounds very neat. The reply would have to be that a lot of introspection is not judgement, but direct perception of self-evident facts and truths. I agree with Heil.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem
                        Full Idea: If causal relations boil down to nothing more than regularities (as Hume suggests), then it is a mistake to regard the absence of a mechanism or causal link between mental events and material events as a special problem.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.2)
                        A reaction: So critics of Descartes who were baffled by interaction, were actually sniffing Hume's wholesale scepticism about necessary causation. Even so, physical conjunction is more tangible than spiritual conjunction.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions
                        Full Idea: If there are elementary particles, then they are certainly capable of endless interactions beyond those in which they actually engage. Everything points to dispositionality being a fundamental feature of our world.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: I'm not convinced that my ontology has to include something called a 'disposition'. Dispositions are the consequence of how things are. Are there passive dispositions?
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene
                        Full Idea: Any attempt to say what behaviour follows from a given state of mind can be shown to be false by producing an example in which the state of mind is present but, owing to the addition of new beliefs and desires, the behaviour does not follow.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3)
                        A reaction: The objection seems misplaced against eliminative behaviourism, because there are held to be no mental states to correlate with the behavior. There is just behaviour, some times the same, sometimes different.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property
                        Full Idea: Although your heart is a material object, the property of being a heart is, if we accept the functionalist picture, not a material property.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4)
                        A reaction: Presumably functional properties are not physical because they are multiply realisable. The property of being a heart is more like a theoretical flow diagram than it is like a muscle. That word 'property' again…
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
                        Full Idea: If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: The problem is not that qualia must be denied, but that there is strong pressure to class them as epiphenomena. However, a raw colour can have a causal role (e.g. in an art gallery). Best to say (with Chalmers?) that functions cause qualia?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels
                        Full Idea: The categories definitive of a given science mark off boundaries that are largely invisible within science at lower levels. That is why there is, in general, no prospect of reducing a higher-level science to a science at some lower level.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4)
                        A reaction: This sounds slick, but I am unconvinced. Molecules only exist at the level of chemistry, but they are built up out of physics, and the 'boundaries' could be explained in physics, if you had the knowledge and patience.
Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels
                        Full Idea: The categories embedded in a higher-level science (psychology, for instance) designate genuine properties of objects, which are not reducible to properties found in sciences at lower levels.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4)
                        A reaction: This isn't an argument against reductionism. It is obviously true that someone with a physics degree won't make a good doctor. It's these wretched 'property' things again. Is 'found repulsive by me' a property terrorists?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
                        Full Idea: 'Property dualism' is the view according to which the mental and the physical are not distinguishable kinds of substance, but distinct families of properties.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.2 n)
                        A reaction: I am struggling to make sense of properties being in distinct families. If it is like smells and colours, it doesn't say much, and if the difference is more profound then it begins to look like old-fashioned dualism in disguise.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties
                        Full Idea: The early identity theorists talked of identifying mental processes with brain processes, but I am now proposing it as a theory about properties.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3)
                        A reaction: Since a process is presumably composed of more basic ontological ingredients, this is presumably a good move, but there is still a vagueness about the whole concept of a 'property'.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
                        Full Idea: Some have argued that eliminativism about propositional attitudes is self-refuting. If no one believes anything, then how could we believe the eliminativist thesis?
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5)
                        A reaction: Sounds slick, but it doesn't strike me as a big problem. Presumably you don't 'believe' eliminativism. You treat some of your brain processes as if they fell into the fictional category of 'belief'.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem
                        Full Idea: The identity theory is preferable to dualism since 1) if mental events are neurological, it is easy to explain causal relations between them, and 2) if we can account for mental phenomena by reference to brains and their properties, we don't need minds.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3)
                        A reaction: One might add that it fits into the overall scientific world, and permits the possible closure of physics. The challenge is that identity theory must 'save the phenomena'.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them
                        Full Idea: The functionalists' point is that higher-level properties like being in pain or computing the sum of 7 and 5 are not to be identified with ("reduced to") or mistaken for their realisers.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4)
                        A reaction: I take it that functionalist minds can't be reduced because they are abstractions rather than physical entities. Nevertheless, the implied ontology seems to be entirely physical, and hence in some sense reductionist.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised
                        Full Idea: Proponents of multiple realisability regard it as vital to distinguish realised, higher-level properties from their lower-level realisers.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: So that the very idea of 'multiple realisability' begs the question. Minds are private, so it is never clear what has been realised, especially in non-linguistic brains.
Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things
                        Full Idea: Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties; it is the phenomenon of predicates applying to objects in virtue of distinct, though pertinently similar, properties possessed by those objects.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: The analogies for multiple realisability usually involve functions rather than properties or predicates (different types of corkscrew). Pain or belief in danger are not just 'predicates'.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one
                        Full Idea: Imagine a neuroscientist who is intimately familiar with the physiology of headaches, but who has never actually experienced a headache.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3)
                        A reaction: A more realistic version of Frank Jackson's 'Mary'. Doctors need to know that headaches are unpleasant; what they actually feel like seems irrelevant (epiphenomenal). What's it like to only have two pairs of shoes?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional?
                        Full Idea: A fierce debate has raged between proponents of 'pictorial' conceptions of imagery (Kosslyn) and those who take imagery to be propositional (Pylyshyn).
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
                        A reaction: This may not be a simple dilemma. Pure pictorial imagery seem possible (abstract patterns) and pure propositions are okay (maths), but in most thought they are inextricable. The image is the proposition (a nuclear cloud).
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are
                        Full Idea: Folk psychology and neuroscience are not competitors, any more than cartography and geology are competitors.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5)
                        A reaction: This seems true enough, unless someone like Fodor claims that the correct way to do neuroscience is to try to explicate folk psychology categories in terms of brain function. Folk psychology is fine for folk.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning'
                        Full Idea: I intend the notion of truth-conditions to correspond to what I have called 'literal meaning'.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5)
                        A reaction: Yes. If I identify myself to you by saying "the spam is in the fridge", that always has a literal meaning (which we assemble from the words), as well as connotation in this particular context.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble'
                        Full Idea: There is something puzzling about the notion that someone could understand the sentences "birds warble" and "tigers growl", yet have no idea what the sentence "tigers warble" meant.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5)
                        A reaction: True enough, but this need not imply the full thesis of linguistic holism. Words are assembled like bricks. I know tigers might warble, but stones don't. Might fish warble? Or volcanoes? I must know that 'birds warble' is not a tautology.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them?
                        Full Idea: Anyone who takes propositions to be abstract entities owes the rest of us an account of how human beings could interact with such things.
                        From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5)
                        A reaction: He makes this sound impossible, but that would mean that all abstraction is impossible, and there are no such things as ideas and concepts. In the end something has to be miraculous, so let it be our ability to think about abstractions.