Ideas from 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest' by David Lewis [1986], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' by Lewis,David [CUP 1999,0-521-58787-5]].

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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory
                        Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory.
                        From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110)
                        A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures
                        Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
                        From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
                        A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.