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Ideas from 'Finkish dispositions' by David Lewis [1997], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' by Lewis,David [CUP 1999,0-521-58787-5]].

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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion
                        Full Idea: To avoid the danger of claiming that dispositions are their own categorical bases, we do better to eschew the alleged distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties altogether.
                        From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II)
                        A reaction: Since I have been unable to form any intuitive notion of what a 'categorical' property is, I like this, though not necessarily for his reason.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15463 All dispositions must have causal bases
                        Full Idea: Prior, Pargetter and Jackson have argued convincingly for the thesis that all dispositions must have causal bases.
                        From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II)
                        A reaction: [Their paper is 1982] This key thesis is tackled by modern defenders of powers. The question is not who has the best arguments, but who offers the most coherent picture. What is a 'causal basis'? What sort of thing could be primitive or fundamental?
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
15461 A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs
                        Full Idea: A disposition which would straight away vanish if put to the test is called 'finkish'. A finkishly fragile thing is fragile so long as it is not struck. But if it were struck, it would straight away cease to be fragile, and it would not break.
                        From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I)
                        A reaction: There are also 'antidotes'. Finks kill the disposition, antidotes kill the effect. These cases are problems for the simple conditional analysis of a disposition - because we never achieved the consequent.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents
                        Full Idea: 'Backtracking' counterfactual reasoning runs from a counterfactually supposed event to the causal antecedents it would have to have had.
                        From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I)
                        A reaction: Why not call it a 'transcendental' counterfactual? Presumably you go thisworld>> counterfactualevent>> worldneededtocauseit. It conjures up two possible worlds instead of one.