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Ideas from 'Many, but almost one' by David Lewis [1993], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' by Lewis,David [CUP 1999,0-521-58787-5]].

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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
15538 Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about)
                        Full Idea: Semantic indecision will suffice to explain the phenomenon of vagueness. [note] Provided that there exist the many precisifications for us to be undecided between. If you deny this, you will indeed have need of vague objects.
                        From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'Two solutions')
                        A reaction: [He mentions Van Inwagen 1990:213-83] There seem to be three solutions to vague objects: that they really are vague, that they are precise but we can't know precisely, or Lewis's view. I like Lewis's view. Do animals have any problem with vagueness?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
15537 If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many
                        Full Idea: To deny that there are many cats on the mat (because removal of a few hairs seems to produce a new one), we must either deny that the many are cats, or else deny that the cats are many. ...I think both alternatives lead to successful solutions.
                        From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The paradox')
                        A reaction: He credits the problem to Geach (and Tibbles), and says it is the same as Unger's 'problem of the many' (Idea 15536).
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
15536 We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it
                        Full Idea: Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be boundaries of a cloud; therefore many aggregates of droplets are equally good candidates to be the cloud. How is it that we have just one cloud? And yet we do. This is Unger's (1980) 'problem of the many'.
                        From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The problem')
                        A reaction: This is the problem of vague objects, as opposed to the problem of vague predicates, or the problem of vague truths, or the problem of vague prepositions (like 'towards').
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
15539 Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it
                        Full Idea: The cardinal principle of pragmatics is that the right way to take what is said, if at all possible, is the way that makes sense of the message.
                        From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'A better solution')
                        A reaction: Thus when someone misuses a word, suggesting nonsense, we gloss over it, often without even mentioning it, because the underlying sense is obvious. A good argument for the existence of propositions. Lewis doesn't mention truth.