Ideas from 'Armstrong on combinatorial possibility' by David Lewis [1992], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' by Lewis,David [CUP 1999,0-521-58787-5]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions
                        Full Idea: I suggest that Armstrong has an unfamiliar notion of analysis, as not primarily a quest for definitions, but as a quest for truth-makers.
                        From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand')
                        A reaction: This is not a dichotomy, I think, but a shift of emphasis. A definition will probably refer to truthmakers; a decent account of truthmakers would approximate a definition.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists
                        Full Idea: Predications seem, for the most part, to be true not because of whether things are, but because of how things are.
                        From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand')
                        A reaction: This simple point shows that you get into a tangle if you insist that truthmakers just consist of what exists. Lewis says Armstrong offers states of affairs as truthmakers for predications.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly
                        Full Idea: I want to say that 'truth is supervenient on being', but as an Ostrich about universals I want to construe 'being' broadly.
                        From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'Truth')
                        A reaction: [His slogan is borrowed from Bigelow 1988:132-,158-9] This seems much more promising that the more precise and restricted notion of truthmakers, as resting on the existence of particular things. Presentism is the big test case.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on
                        Full Idea: Presentism says that although there is nothing outside the present, yet there are past-tensed and future-tensed truths that do not supervene on the present, and hence do not supervene on being.
                        From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], p.207)
                        A reaction: Since I rather like both presentism and truth supervening on being, this observation comes as rather a devastating blow. I thought philosophy would be quite easy, but it's turning out to be rather tricky. Could tensed truths supervene on the present?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine
                        Full Idea: To me it is mysterious how a state of affairs is made out of its particular and universal constituents. Different states of affairs may have the very same constituents, and the existence of constituents by no means entails the existence of the states.
                        From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'What is there')
                        A reaction: He is rejecting the structure of states of affairs as wholes made of parts. But then mereology was never going to explain the structure of the world.