Ideas from 'On Relations of Universals and Particulars' by Bertrand Russell [1911], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Logic and Knowledge' by Russell,Bertrand (ed/tr Marsh,Robert Charles) [Routledge 1956,0-415-09074-1]].

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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them
                        Full Idea: Russell noted that you cannot arrive at general facts by inference from numerous particular facts, ..but general facts logically supervene on particular ones. So the general facts supervene, but are not entailed.
                        From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Relations of Universals and Particulars [1911]) by Karen Bennett - Supervenience §3.2
                        A reaction: The belief that the general facts supervene on the particular ones then seems to be more a matter of faith than of fact. Or maybe it is analytic, depending on what we understand by 'general'. Universal, or generalised?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other
                        Full Idea: The trope theorist cannot explain how a number of tropes resemble each other.
                        From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Relations of Universals and Particulars [1911]) by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 07.6
                        A reaction: [My 13,000th Idea: 31/10/11] Every theory is left with something it cannot explain. Is it likely that we could come up with an explanation of resemblance? It seems like a combination of identity in the physics, and identity in the brain mechanisms.