Ideas from 'On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning' by Bertrand Russell [1919], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Logic and Knowledge' by Russell,Bertrand (ed/tr Marsh,Robert Charles) [Routledge 1956,0-415-09074-1]].

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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs
                        Full Idea: We call a belief true when it is belief in a true proposition, ..but it is to propositions that the primary formal meanings of 'truth' and 'falsehood' apply.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
                        A reaction: I think this is wrong. A proposition such as 'it is raining' would need a date-and-time stamp to be a candidate for truth, and an indexical statement such as 'I am ill' would need to be asserted by a person. Of course, books can contain unread truths.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers'
                        Full Idea: I take it as evident that the truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers'.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], p.285)
                        A reaction: A nice bold commitment to a controversial idea. The traditional objection is to ask how you are going to formulate the 'facts' except in terms of more beliefs, so you ending up comparing beliefs. Facts are a metaphysical commitment, not an acquaintance.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky
                        Full Idea: The correspondence of proposition and fact grows increasingly complicated as we pass to more complicated types of propositions: existence-propositions, general propositions, disjunctive and hypothetical propositions, and so on.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
                        A reaction: An important point. Truth must not just work for 'it is raining', but also for maths, logic, tautologies, laws etc. This is why so many modern philosophers have retreated to deflationary and minimal accounts of truth, which will cover all cases.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character
                        Full Idea: There are three issues about belief: 1) the content which is believed, 2) the relation of the content to its 'objective' - the fact which makes it true or false, and 3) the element which is belief, as opposed to consideration or doubt or desire.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
                        A reaction: The correct answers to the questions (trust me) are that propositions are the contents, the relation aimed at is truth, which is a 'metaphysical ideal' of correspondence to facts, and belief itself is an indefinable feeling. See Hume, Idea 2208.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches
                        Full Idea: If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
                        A reaction: Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws
                        Full Idea: There do seem to be psychological and physical causal laws which are distinct from each other.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
                        A reaction: This sounds like the essence of 'property dualism'. Reductive physicalists (like myself) say there is no distinction. Davidson, usually considered a property dualist, claims there are no psycho-physical laws. Russell notes that reduction may be possible.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions
                        Full Idea: The important beliefs, even if they are not the only ones, are those which, if rendered into explicit words, take the form of a proposition.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
                        A reaction: This assertion is close to the heart of the twentieth century linking of ontology and epistemology to language. It is open to challenges. Why is non-propositional belief unimportant? Do dogs have important beliefs? Can propositions exist non-verbally?
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition'
                        Full Idea: I shall distinguish a proposition expressed in words as a 'word-proposition', and one consisting of images as an 'image-proposition'.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
                        A reaction: This, I think, is good, though it raises the question of what exactly an 'image' is when it is non-visual, as when a dog believes its owner called. This distinction prevents us from regarding all knowledge and ontology as verbal in form.
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely
                        Full Idea: A proposition may be defined as: what we believe when we believe truly or falsely.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], p.285)
                        A reaction: If we define belief as 'commitment to truth', Russell's last six words become redundant. "Propositions are the contents of beliefs", it being beliefs which are candidates for truth, not propositions. (Russell agrees, on p.308!)